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Milton‟s Moral History: Tracing Diachronic Continuity in Paradise Lost. Major 
Professor: Catherine G. Martin 
 
This thesis starts from the observation that the plot of Paradise Lost is driven 
by changes in the moral universe. First, I attempt to trace the progression of Christian 
moral history by identify distinct normative moral structures and acknowledging the 
gaps created by the structures‟ incompatibilities. Then, history organized by looking 
though Thomas Kuhn‟s paradigmatical model of history. Kuhn‟s historical model, 
however, fragments the timeline but reveals a theological anxiety about the continuity 
of moral law. I argue that continuity is restored in the poem by exhibiting the 
components of moral agency that Milton defines in Areopagitica. Paradise Lost, 
justifies the differences in the moral landscape and establishes a diachronic continuity 
by weaving Milton‟s theory of the moral agent into each of the successive moral 
paradigms.   
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Introduction: The Problem of Continuity in Christian Moral History 
 Milton‟s portrayal of moral history in Paradise Lost
1
 can best be understood 
through Kuhnian paradigm development, each moral era superseding the last by 
creating a new and distinct normative moral system. This historical perspective 
manifests itself in response to the theological anxiety about the structural 
incompatibility of the eras of moral history.  Milton also seems to be interested in 
continuity, which manifests in his metaphysical coherence.
2
 In addition, Milton‟s 
coherent cosmos offers a panoramic view of creation that represents a continuity of 
place between Heaven, Hell, and Earth. If Milton is interested in creating this material 
continuity as part of his project to “justify the ways of God to man,” then one might 
expect he would also strive for continuity between the moral paradigms of heavenly 
and earthly existence and pre- and postlapsarian existence, as well as between the Old 
and New Testaments. The contention of this thesis is that Milton does attempt to 
reconcile these different moral paradigms, which I will examine of a particular 
development of moral agency found in Areopagitica and an exploration of the 
structure of his moral history using Thomas Kuhn‟s model of the history of science in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
3
 The analysis that follows gives insight into 
Milton‟s passion for reason and the individual‟s freedom to act and interpret, further, 
                                                 
1
 John Milton, The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton ed William Kerrigan, 




 Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991) which explores the metaphysical coherence of Paradise Lost in his book, and elaborates on 




 Thomas Kuhn discusses his theory of the history of science in his book, The Structures of 
Scientific Revolutions 3
rd
 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
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it reveals certain anxieties about its place in Christian history, an anxiety that he 
dramatizes and solves in Paradise Lost. 
 Milton, of course, is not the first to attempt to reconcile seemingly 
incompatible paradigms of moral history. Joachim of Fiore, a twelfth-century Italian 
theologian, wrote Libre Concordie Novi ae Veteris Testamenti or “The Harmony of 
the Old and New Testaments.” Joachim developed a theory of moral history that 
divided the timeline between the fall and the second coming of Christ into three 
periods, the first of which belongs to the father and is characterized by the law found 
in the Old Testament. The second age characterized by grace and begins with the first 
coming of Christ and belongs to the Son. Finally, the third age, marked by love, starts 
in Joachim‟s near future and belongs to the Holy Spirit. Milton‟s epic, however, 
encompasses pre-human Christian history and his cosmos is infused with moral value, 
which means he must alter Joachim‟s structure of moral history. Milton does this for 
a number of reasons: first, the scope of Paradise Lost requires him to account for 
moral history prior to humanity, while preserving continuity in the cosmos. Second, 
his reconciliation of the disparate moral paradigms requires a foundation that persists 
throughout that history. That is, the force that reconciles the Old and the New 
Testaments must be intrinsically true of the nature of morality.  
 Milton‟s moral agency is most clearly articulated in Areopagitica, in which he 
dismisses a paternalistic moral law in favor of an individual‟s reason by saying “God 
uses not to captivate under perpetual childhood of prescription but trusts him with the 
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gift of reason to be his own chooser” (938). Thomas Fulton
4
 identifies the childhood 
to which Milton refers as Eden, the passage leads to commentary on the fall. First, 
however, Milton mentions Solomon‟s assertion that “reading is weariness to the 
flesh,” yet maintains that it was never denounced as unlawful in scripture. That is, 
before he comments on Eden, Milton first references the height of Mosaic Law. 
Therefore, whether or not his aim was Eden, his rejection of paternalistic moral law 
catches Old Testament or Mosaic Law in the crossfire. Indeed, the fissure between 
Milton‟s version of morality and Mosaic Law widens when he claims that reason, 
which he defines as choosing, is not only able to discern moral facts, but influences 
the moral world by deriving good from potentially libelous or harmful materials. In 
other words, Milton‟s version of moral law and its relationship to agency seems to be 
incongruent with the spirit of the Old Testament Mosaic Law which is, at least in 
part, prescriptive in nature because it emphasizes which specific actions are right and 
wrong. Areopagitica, on the other hand, denounces prescription in favor of teaching 
the skill of discerning right and wrong, and even deriving positive outcomes from 
potentially harmful moral influences. This means that Milton must reconcile the Old 
Testament moral paradigm with his own to maintain coherence in the theodicy he is 
representing while still preserving scripture and the immutability of God. 
 Since Mosaic Law emphasizes specific actions that are right or wrong in a 
catalog of more than 600 laws, the Old Testament paradigm presents a normative 
deontological structure. That is a moral structure based on adherence to a set of rules 
or laws. Deontology implicitly asserts that moral value is located in the moral object 
                                                 
4
 Thomas Fulton explores Milton‟s sentiments regarding the new epistemology in the 
Seventeenth-century in his article, “Areopagitica and the Roots of Liberal Epistemology” English 
Literary Renaissance 34.1 (Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2004) 65. 
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or action, itself; however, Milton‟s agency in Areopagitica displaces moral value 
from the object to the subject—or more accurately to the interaction between the 
moral object and the moral subject. Milton‟s morality, then, presents a normative 
structure of virtue ethics which conflicts with the deontological structure of the Old 
Testament. Parsing the conflict in terms of normative structures clarifies the problems 
that theologians like Joachim of Fiore and Milton face in attempting to establish 
continuity between the Old and New Testaments. In other words, while Milton 
emphasizes will and reason in every paradigm of Christian moral history, he must 
account for the paternalism endemic to the deontological structure that preceded his 
own which he denounces in Areopagitica.  
 Michael‟s explanation of the purpose of Mosaic Law in Book XII of Paradise 
Lost claims that the “law was given to evince / their natural pravity” to the Jews and 
so that “when they see / Law can discover sin” (286-90). While Michael does not 
deny the paternalistic deontology of Mosaic Law he does place the moral agent at the 
center of its purpose. In a sense, Milton argues both in Areopagitica and Paradise 
Lost that humanity graduates from the deontological structure of the Old Testament to 
a New Testament where humanity completely wields the power of agency in a virtue 
ethics paradigm. Agency, on this account, thus has a flexible relationship to both law 
and to God throughout moral history. That makes the transition from the Old to the 
New Testament a “graduation” that may be less metaphorical than it originally seems. 
While agency has a different relationship to the law in these two paradigms, it seems 
that this difference is strongly affected by knowledge. In other words, Milton sees the 
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Old Testament as a learning experience designed to build agents‟ capacity for the 
active discernment outlined in Areopagitica. 
 It is necessary to gain a clear idea of Milton‟s conception of the moral agent in 
order to understand his moral history. A large part of establishing an agent‟s 
responsibilities and relationship to moral law comes from determining the source of 
authority. Fulton identifies Milton‟s moral system as a “self-authenticating method of 
ethical reasoning;” that is, the moral authority is located in the active agent itself (53). 
As “an uncompromising champion of individual libertas,” Milton gives moral 
authority to the individual agent through what Christopher Kendrick calls a “self-
validating ethos” (Myers, 385; 671).
5
 The authority of the agent, in Kendrick‟s view, 
is based in the abilities of the mind to “differentiate” between good and evil which he 
calls “ethical cognition.” However, this means that Milton‟s morality has agents 
actively generating moral value or meaning since it is the action of interpreting the 
moral world that produces such value. In other words, without engagement with the 
moral world with moral reason there is no moral situation, thus, to a large extent, 
moral value issues from the moral agent. Nevertheless, when agents act morally they 
are—or should be—reacting to internal cognitive forces of interpretation rather than 
simply responding to the external stimuli of law and moral objects. 
 The idea that Milton‟s moral agent reacts to internal, rather than external 
forces opens up a related but slightly different debate: how does Milton consider the 
construction of truth? This is one of the chief critical concerns in Areopagitica. John 
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 Christopher Kendrick investigates the ethical dimensions of Milton‟s mission in 
Areopagitica in his article, “Ethics and the Orator in Areopagitica” ELH 50.4 (Johns Hopkins 




Schaeffer in his article “Metonymies We Read By: Rhetoric, Truth, and the Eucharist 
in Milton‟s Areopagitica”
6
 identifies two distinct constructions of truth that Milton 
presents: first, truth is an incrementally built body of knowledge, and second, truth is 
a static unified object that can be possessed. However, Kendrick, Fulton, and 
Benjamin Myers‟ view that Areopagitica champions the practice of morality over the 
moral value itself emphasizes the incremental and consensual model of truth over the 
objectification of truth. Indeed, Fulton says that Areopagitica values the “process 
over the knowledge acquired,” which in turn means that moral truth is not a unified 
monolithic object, but rather a dynamic activity performed by individual agents. 
While their readings do not exclude the alternative model for truth it seems to 
privilege one over the other and makes room for the agent‟s active role in the 
acquisition of truth.  
 Catherine Martin
7
 picks up this theme in her book Ruins of Allegory by saying 
“both physically and morally, Milton‟s epic universe is thus correspondingly 
decentered in ways that radically undermine all previously „certain‟ senses of place, 
personhood, and transcendent virtue” (82). This means that Milton‟s moral 
philosophy diverges from classical conceptions of moral metaphysics. If moral truth 
is incremental and consensual and is actively generated by the practice of gaining 
moral knowledge, then moral truth cannot be manifest in some platonic, transcendent 
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 John Schaffer clearly articulates the concerns about truth in Areopagitica in his article, 
“Metonymies We Read By: Rhetoric, Truth, and the Eucharist in Milton‟s Areopagitica” Milton 
Quarterly 34.3 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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 Catherine Martin‟s thorough treatment of allegory in Paradise Lost becomes relevant here in 
an attempt to identify  the individual‟s engagement with truth in her book, Ruins of Allegory: Paradise 






. In addition to a rejection of platonic metaphysics for the “good” it also is a 
rejection of any type of rigid body of laws, since moral truth could not be contained 
in such a way, nor would laws generate solid moral knowledge given the lack of 
active involvement on the part of the individual agent.  
The active involvement of individual agents of course fits with Kendrick‟s 
“ethical cognition” and the “active knowing” that he develops as a model for Milton‟s 
version of engagement with the moral world. Since this active “differentiation” of 
good and evil is “self-validating” it constitutes a form of moral subjectivism, a well 
recognized feature of moral philosophy in the seventeenth century. Myers
9
 in his 
article “Milton and the Heretical Imperative” calls Milton‟s morality “the subjective 
practice of radical religious individualism” (376, original emphasis). However, 
implicit in Milton‟s brand of subjectivism is consequentialism,
10
 since, as he points 
out, two agents performing the exact same action—say, reading a pornographic 
book—may produce opposite values. In framing morality around the practice of 
discernment, he decenters moral value from the moral object and locates it in the 
consequence of the interaction between the agent and the object. In other words, the 
results that any given agent generates in the act of interpreting the moral world are 
what determine the value of the moral event.  
                                                 
8
 Plato‟s moral theory rests on the belief that moral events participate in an eternal truth; 
however, Milton removes moral value from the eternal truth and the object when he places such great 
emphasis on the moral agent and its personal education.  
 
9
 Benjamin Myers calls attention to the subjective aspects of Milton‟s philosophy in 
Areopagitica in his article, “ „Following the Way Which is Called Heresy‟: Milton and the Heretical 
Imperative” Journal of the History of Ideas 69.3 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) 376. 
 
10
 The difference between deontology and consequentialism is essentially the same as the 
difference between Plato and Milton. Deontology assumes that moral value is located in moral events 
themselves as in Emanuel Kant‟s necessary prohibition on lying, while consequentialism maintains 
that moral values are instead found in the consequences that result from moral events; utilitarianism is 
a form of consequentialism. 
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Kendrick, among others, identifies the “warfarring Christian” as the model 
moral agent who actively seeks moral knowledge and produces positive moral 
consequences from potentially harmful materials. However, what distinguishes the 
“warfarring Christian” from the “fool” is the active pursuit of moral knowledge with 
the goal of sharpening one‟s moral discernment. If this motivation to pursue moral 
knowledge and abilities is what makes a “good” moral agent in Areopagitica, then 
there is tremendous pressure to investigate the moral world, and even educate oneself 
through experience. Experience in this case becomes a tricky concept since 
Areopagitica is mainly about reading and perhaps not necessarily engaging in illicit 
acts. In other words, does Milton‟s moral philosophy translate out of research and 
into practice? The answer to this question is yes and no. No, you cannot engage in 
illicit activities in the name of moral knowledge and remain sinless, nor is morality 
random in the sense that agents can invent their own moral law. However, you are 
still a “warfarring Christian” if you engage with such activities and internalize the 
knowledge that resulted from the encounter for future similar entanglements. 
Milton talks most directly about the pursuit of moral knowledge through 
experience when he says:  
 
Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is so necessary to the 
constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of 
truth, how can we more safely and with less danger scout into the regions of 
sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner 





The model for attaining truth described in this passage confirms truth through 
negation, which means that moral agents have to determine the “good” through trial 
and error. In a sense, the “warfarring Christian” is asked to experiment with the moral 
world, scanning and surveying evil to confirm moral truth. In light of Kendrick‟s 
“self-validating ethos,” Milton‟s theory of morality becomes empirical, or rather, he 
is applying the new philosophy to morality. The “process” of morality in 
Areopagitica, then, becomes a science, an on-going effort to seek truth through 
experimentation and observation. However, the connection between morality and 
science does have to be qualified as analogous since truth in morality is interwoven 
with the agent‟s subjectivity in a different way than, say, astronomy. Nevertheless, 
Areopagitica presents a well-defined moral philosophy that involves 
experimentation—redeploying empiricism in the moral world. 
Daniel Fried
11
 calls Milton an “implicit empiricist” because, while he has no 
explicit theory of empiricism, his prose emphasizes knowledge gained through 
experience (124). Martin goes further by describing Milton‟s morality in Paradise 
Lost as follows: “moral choices have been reconciled as a kind of probabilistic, 
although not random, moral calculus replacing the pseudo-science” that preceded it 
(104). Moral choices, if the agent is acting with volition, involves reason; however, 
the activity of moral reason (which is itself choosing) is to “actively know” the moral 
world by discerning good and evil. The foundation of Milton‟s morality presented in 
Areopagitica is the process of coming to know what is good and evil, which 
emphasizes the epistemological dimension of moral philosophy over other 
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 Daniel Fried qualifies Milton‟s relationship to the concept of empiricism in his article, 
“Milton and Empiricist Semiotics” Milton Quarterly 37.3 (Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2003) 124. 
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metaethical concerns. However, Fulton counteracts what he recognizes as subsequent 
assumptions that stymied discussion of ethical-epistemology in Milton‟s works, 
saying: “it was this very application of epistemology to moral and political 
philosophy that characterized English philosophy of the early Enlightenment” (48). 
 Martin notices the reflection of Milton‟s emphasis on a posteriori knowledge 
in Paradise Lost when she says that “Milton‟s dialogue on astronomy reveals his 
deep regard for the role that both empirical and self-knowledge must play in a 
materially expanding cosmos” (102). The moral philosophy in Areopagitica is, as a 
result, dramatized in Paradise Lost and marks in imaginative space the trace of the 
perspective generated by the new philosophy.
 12
 Paradise Lost, to a large extent, 
applies this perspective to Christian moral history. Paul Cefalu in Moral Identity in 
Early Modern English Literature
13
 identifies Adam and Eve‟s moral agency as 
Irenean rather than Augustinian, meaning they advance through trial and error and 
were not created perfect. In short, they become proto-scientists in a new moral world. 
Thus, as Martin says, Adam and Eve, through their partially restored reason, begin 
recovering from the fall “through objective self-disciplined observation as well as 
faith” (102).  
 The moral agent as a proto-scientist pursues moral knowledge through an 
individual empirical project which means that the individual‟s place in history is 
simultaneously connected and disconnected from the tradition of which it is a part. A 
                                                 
12
 Marjorie Nicolson investigates the effect that new scientific instruments like the telescope 
has on imaginative spaces in her article, “Milton and the Telescope” ELH 2.1 (Johns Hopkins 




 Paul Cefalu discusses the individual‟s capacity to exercise moral agency in Seventeenth-
century England in his book, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004)  
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very basic formulation of the moral situation and a moral agent‟s participation therein 
is a process involving three major facets: first, the agent must identify an object as a 
moral object, second, they must determine the value of that object (good or evil) and 
finally, the agent must choose a course of action. Of course, Milton‟s formulation of 
this is centered on the agent and its process, rather than the object, making moral 
discernment a “probabilistic, though not random” calculation, as Martin says. Agents 
are therefore connected to one another in moral history in their pursuit of right moral 
action and the criteria that makes actions, moral actions; however, they are 
disconnected in the sense that their own subjectivity is at play in the moral process 
both in terms of immediate historical context and idiosyncrasy. This does not mean, 
however, that moral truth is random or relative but that the moral world is filtered 
through an agent‟s particular engagement with the moral world. That is, the Old 
Testament agent and the New Testament agent are disconnected because they each 
have very different rules of engagement in regards to the moral world and because 
they each possess separate, opaque human minds. Yet, they are connected because the 
criteria for moral agency, according to Milton, are consistent, and they are pursuing 
the same end: right moral action and truth. 
 The relationship between agents throughout Christian moral history is 
analogous to the relationship between scientists in Thomas Kuhn‟s model for the 
history of science. Scientists are united in their attempt to explain the natural world, 
yet when comparing them across the landscape of the history of science it becomes 
apparent that “those once current views are neither less scientific, nor more a product 
of idiosyncrasy than those current today” (2). Kuhn‟s construction discards the 
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traditional “development-by-accumulation” model of the history of science because it 
does not represent the true complexity of an event like the discovery of oxygen
14
. In 
other words, Kuhn explains that the traditional model of history does not include the 
subject and its interaction with the object. Indeed, he speaks of nascent sciences as a 
competition between rival explanations for the phenomena in question, yet are 
consistent with the “dictates of scientific observation and method” (4). This means 
that each rival explanation plays by the same rules both in an immediate and remote 
historical context, which is why the development of the scientific method was 
foundational to forging a community around the pursuit of scientific truth. However, 
Milton‟s concentration on the process of moral engagement reveals that a foundation 
in process is just as important in the history of Christian morality as it is in the history 
of science. Milton is attempting to establish similar continuity in moral history as 
there is in the history of science. 
 However, as Kuhn explains “observation and experience can and must 
drastically restrict the range of scientific belief” in an effort to reduce the subjectivity 
at play in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Therefore, a method that continually 
scrutinized both allows new discovery and individual liberty while accounting for the 
complexity of a system that involves a multitude of both competing and cooperating 
individuals. However, in the next breath, Kuhn recognizes the trade-off as follows: 
 
But [observation and experience] cannot alone determine a body of such 
belief. An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and 
                                                 
14
 Kuhn‟s famous example is the discovery of oxygen which, as he points out, could be 
reasonably credited to at least three different people over the course of  30 years. He uses this to prove 
his point that science does not fit the model of steady progress, sign-posted by discreet discoveries. 
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historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by 
a given scientific community at a given time. (4) 
 
In other words, Kuhn discards the diachronic continuity provided by the 
“development-by-accumulation” model because subjectivity fragments the history of 
science. Instead, Kuhn adopts a synchronic view of history when he says “rather than 
seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, the 
attempt is to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time” (3). He 
sacrifices the diachronic continuity in the history of science in favor of a synchronic 
account that incorporates the complexity of the scientific enterprise. Thus, he 
fragments the timeline of science into a series of paradigms punctuated by major 
shifts in scientific belief or methodology.  
 Kuhn‟s paradigm model characterizes Milton‟s representation of Christian 
moral history in Paradise Lost because his model for moral engagement is parallel to 
scientific engagement which is at the center of Kuhn‟s model. The problems of 
subjectivity and historical context plague both histories and fragment diachronic 
continuity. However, while Kuhn abandons diachrony, Milton cannot sacrifice 
continuity in Christian moral history since the Old Testament would then cease to be 
relevant and God would prove to be mutable. In an effort to rescue continuity from 
complete subjectivity and incomparable normative structures, Milton constructs his 
history in Paradise Lost in a way that resembles Kuhn‟s paradigm model, a move that 
seems to fragment the eras of moral history further. However, the text also provides a 
trace of agency, echoed from Areopagitica, and establishes a diachronic lynch-pin 
that maintains both synchrony and diachrony in Christian moral history. Kuhn‟s 
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model provides a structure though which to understand how Paradise Lost attempts to 
connect the disparate moral structure represented throughout moral history and 
answer long-standing theological inconsistencies.  
 Before moving into a direct model of the paradigm structure in Paradise Lost 
it is important to briefly qualify the nature of the subjectivity in Milton‟s moral 
system. It seems that the individual‟s ability to generate moral meaning in the act of 
interpreting the moral world combined with the subjectivity that results from personal 
and historical context means that Milton‟s morality in Areopagitica, and by extension 
Paradise Lost, is relative. That is, the discernment that is encouraged in moral agents 
is a process that seems to invent the moral good and therefore moral law, according to 
personal and historical happenstance. However, a model like this would conflict with 
Milton‟s sense of order and his efforts to establish continuity, which manifests in his 
metaphysical monism and epic representation of moral history, not to mention the 
allegorization of chaos and order in the figures of Chaos and God. In short, it is clear 
that Milton would not advocate rampant moral relativism which the strong version of 
moral agency in Areopagitica seems to suggest; however, it does beg the question as 
to what brings this model of morality back from the brink of moral relativism. The 
counter-balance to the subjective element in this moral theory is the development of a 
necessary feature of the relationship between creator and created. This relationship 
brings with it an obligation on the part of the created to follow the decrees of their 
creator as a gesture of gratitude for their own being. 
 To sketch the problem in a slightly different manner, the “subjective practice 
of radical religious individualism” suggests that among the multitude of agents each 
19 
 
has a different path. They seek truth in their own way and generate moral value in a 
process of discernment that results from “ethical cognition.” All of this effort is 
deeply affected by the agent‟s context. This paints a picture of a web of agents each 
moving in his or her own direction, but this is only a part of the picture. Even though 
each agent starts in a particular place resulting from personal and historical 
happenstance, all roads lead to God and his work. The reason that the “good” leads to 
God is derived from the ontological relationship between God and moral agents: he 
created them. Because every agent owes his or her being to God, He is by definition 
superior and by this they are obligated to abide by divine decrees. In other words, 
every moral agent in every moral paradigm is subject to the law of obligation. This 
presents a paradox between Milton‟s moral discernment and the law of obligation 
because this obligation seems to conflate the Old and New Testament paradigms as 
based on the same principle. However, the law of obligation undermines the agent‟s 
cognitive abilities only to limit the freedom of discernment and rescue morality from 
absolute subjectivity. That is, if the law of obligation did not limit the moral agent‟s 
freedom moral law would be so involved with the agent‟s discernment that it would 
become a function of their engagement with the moral world; moral law would 
become subjective, and therefore arbitrary. 
 This feature of the moral philosophy in Paradise Lost is most directly 
discussed in the debate between Abdiel and Satan. The disagreement in this scene 
stems from their varying interpretations or deductions about the origins of the angels‟ 
being. Abdiel argues that through faith in God they know that he created them and 
that they owe him their existence. As a result, according to Abdiel, the appropriate 
20 
 
moral emotion toward God is gratitude and this gratitude manifests itself in abiding 
by the dictates of divine will. Satan, on the other hand, claims that they “know no 
time when they were not as now” and, given the evidence, they are as likely “self-
made, self-begot” as they are created by God (V: 859-60). In effect, Satan attempts to 
release the angels from their obligation to God by presenting an alternative 
explanation for their being. This debate posits a necessary obligation that obtains in a 
relationship between creator and creature, and as a result, all roads for moral agents, 
while they may vary, lead to God.  
 Given Milton‟s conception of the moral agent in Areopagitica, I will now turn 
back to the moral history chronicled in Paradise Lost. If the moral system devised in 
his prose is subject to empiricism and experimentation, and can therefore be called a 
science, then theories that deal with the history of science can be applied to Milton‟s 
moral history to elucidate his view of morality as it exists in Christian history. Kuhn‟s 
historical model presents a view of the history of science that hinges on revolutions as 
paradigm shifts, and not as mile markers on a constant crescendo of progress. These 
paradigm shifts are “the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound 
activity of normal science” (6). Paradise Lost is a narrative that spans many 
analogous paradigms and paradigm shifts in moral history. Indeed, the central event 
in the epic is one of the biggest shifts in the moral paradigm in all of human history, 
the fall of Adam and Eve. However, these paradigm shifts are not limited to human 
involvement, but are represented in the narrative prior to Adam and Eve‟s 
appearance, even prior to Raphael‟s delineation of events in heaven. 
21 
 
 I will now turn to a brief overview of Chapter I which discusses the paradigms 
of moral history as presented in Paradise Lost.  The first paradigm represented in the 
chronology of Christian history is God‟s existence as the Augustinian “first cause.” 
Using Augustinian logic, there must have been a time before humans and angels were 
created when God existed alone with the law. Because God has perfect reason and 
“judg‟st always right,” God, the only moral agent at this time, lives in perfect 
harmony with the law. This means that God and the law have a puzzling distinction: 
while the law is derived from God, God also adheres to the law. This is why God can, 
at least apparently, change his mind about humanity‟s sentence for their prophesized 
fall by citing the law of justice. This episode in Book III of Paradise Lost 
demonstrates that divine will and the law are not one and the same thing, since God 
can desire outright mercy, but sentence them to death. In addition, the poem shows 
God changing the law through divine decrees, which happens both explicitly and 
implicitly. The change effected by divine decrees is most clearly seen when Raphael 
chronicles the revelation of the Son and the commandment that “to him shall bow / all 
knees in Heav‟n” (V, 607-8). While this event occurs outside of the paradigm in 
question, it explains the relationship between God and the law prior to the rest of 
creation by demonstrating how the law is separate from divine will, yet derived from 
it. In this case, as opposed to Adam and Eve, what he wills is right because he has 
innate knowledge of his word, and therefore, the law. 
 An example of a divine decree that is implicit in the text also marks the 
transition from the first to the second paradigm. The creation of the angels is an 
introduction of third-party moral agents. There seems to be perfect harmony between 
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angelic moral agency and the law until Lucifer falls. However, perfect harmony with 
the law requires perfect knowledge, and that is what perfect reason is derived from; 
the problem is that Milton‟s angels are necessarily free, but less perfectly rational 
than God. Like Uriel, they may also be deceived. Freedom thus comes with the trade-
off of faith because perfect knowledge would mean that they “serve necessity / not 
[God]” (III, 155). This paradigm does have a sub-paradigm shift embedded in it—the 
fall of Lucifer. The introduction of evil into the universe in a sense constitutes a 
further paradigm shift, but it also merely reveals a danger that was always present 
since every angel was created free to fall. While the angels are more closely 
acquainted with God than humanity, their lack of perfect knowledge makes their 
relationship to God‟s moral law based on faith, and therefore contingent since moral 
choices are necessarily free for Milton. The angels, then, exist within a normative 
virtue ethical system that is motivated by duty, which Abdiel derives from the 
obligation entailed in their debt to God for their being. 
 The law of obligation that is a result of being created persists in the next 
paradigms, which involve the creation of humanity. However, humanity comes with a 
particular type of law that is structured differently from that known in heaven. While 
the angels receive a definitive law in medias res, the humans are created with a single 
prohibitive law: to not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Adam and 
Eve are, like the angels who must bow to the Son, not capable of penetrating the logic 
of this law with their reason; thus, following the law is the result of obedience to 
one‟s creator. This means that while the ethical law of obligation persists, it is 
superseded by this single deontological law since this structure rests more on 
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following a rule than on moral character or adherence to abstract truths. In other 
words, Adam and Eve are presented with a specific law that locates the sinful nature 
of that act in the act itself, not in the agent. Therefore, the paradigm represented in the 
Garden of Eden is distinct from the paradigm that came before it because it centers on 
a deontological normative structure rather than a virtue ethical structure. 
 The fourth paradigm begins with the human fall, and the disobedience of the 
single commandment. This marks a more major paradigm shift than the angels‟ fall 
since it warrants a new moral structure and a period of instability marked by a 
succession of minor paradigm shifts. The law that the remaining angels are subject to 
does not change, nor does it change for Satan and his cohort. On earth, by contrast, 
the moral law shifts in a radical fashion indicating a new paradigm. The paradigm 
following the fall of humanity is roughly equivalent to the Old Testament as modeled 
in books XI and XII of Paradise Lost exhibits a new moral age where minor 
paradigm shifts are frequent compared to previous moral eras. It centers on Old 
Testament Law, which means that humanity has transitioned from a deontological 
singularity (a deontological structure consisting of a single law) to an extreme form of 
deontology with more than six hundred laws. Michael explains the Old Testament 
law in Book XII saying that “the law was given them to evince / their natural pravity” 
and give humanity the capability to “see law” and can therefore “discover sin” (287-
90). This means that the Old Testament, for the most part, is dominated by 
deontological laws because human reason—though partly restored in Adam and 
Eve—is clouded by sin. The fluctuations between greater emphasis on prescriptive 
law on the one hand and an individual agent‟s reason on the other make this a 
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dynamic paradigm. However, it is characterized at its center by a large body of 
prescriptive, deontological laws intended to foster moral reasoning. 
 The fifth paradigm begins with the incarnation of the Son. This would mark 
the beginning of the second age for Joachim of Fiore, but Milton‟s moral history 
reaches further back than Joachim‟s. When Christ introduces the law of love in the 
Christian aphorism: “love thy neighbor as thyself,” he is bringing back a virtue ethical 
structure, restoring human reason and discernment as the impetus for moral action 
and knowledge. Ultimately, humanity was free not only to decide whether or not to 
do what was morally right, but also to investigate and devise what was right. In 
addition, in this paradigm the moral value is removed from the action itself to the 
moral character of the agent and the good or evil consequence that comes from that 
action. This is, of course, the age in which Milton is writing and will presumably 
persist until the second coming, when, as Michael explains, sin and death will finally 
be defeated, and after which harmony will be restored between moral agents and the 
law. 
 Paradise Lost encompasses many of the synchronic paradigms presented in 
Christian moral history, and others are either prophesied or logically implicit, but 
because they exhibit incompatible normative structures, moral continuity is difficult 
to establish. Through a Kuhnian reading of the moral history represented in the poem, 
and given the moral agency outlined in Areopagitica, a clear theory is revealed that 
establishes diachronic continuity through the seemingly incompatible synchronic 
moral paradigms. Through a conception of morality as a process rather than a rigidly 
established set of laws, coupled with an emphasis on agency, Milton is able to unite 
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the incompatible structures presented in Christian moral history. The emphasis on the 
development of an agent in Areopagitica makes morality into an educational 
enterprise which explains Milton‟s empiricism and experimentation in the current 
paradigm. But Michael justifies the Old Testament law by explaining that it is meant 
to instruct agents in how to discover sin, which will in turn allow them to graduate to 
the current virtue ethical paradigm. Therefore, Milton first establishing the 
paradigmatical structure of moral history, then develops a theory of moral agency that 
serves as a diachronic lynch-pin establishing continuity throughout moral history. 
Chapter I will discuss, in detail, the moral paradigms as they are represented or 
implicit in the text of Paradise Lost. Chapter II will then establish the presence of 
moral agency in the poem and offer a potential solution to the moral paradoxes 




Chapter I: The Paradigms of Paradise Lost 
The first task in uncovering Milton‟s version of moral history is to lay bear the 
structures of that history. As a result, the task of this chapter is to present a critical 
exposition of the normative moral structures as they are revealed by the events of 
Paradise Lost. The Objective is to trace each paradigm as it is situated in the 
chronology of Christian history and draw out the distinctions between them that 
represent each paradigm shift. This chapter will attend to each paradigm in turn and 
develop its unique characteristics, revealing how it seems to fit Kuhn‟s fragmented, 
synchronic historical construction. Chapter II will then rehearse these structures while 
diachronically linking them through a formulation of moral agency which stems from 
Areopagitica. In other words, the exposition that follows will set up the theological 
problem of continuity over the course of Christian moral history, while the second 
chapter provides further analysis on the same features of the narrative which offers a 
solution that is built into the narrative moments that seem to pose a problem to 
continuity. The exposition of this problem and its subsequent solution is attempting to 
establish continuity, not only in Christian moral history, but also in the continuity 
between God and the Son as they relate to the moral paradigms with which they are 
associated. In essence, the poems efforts to establish diachronic continuity represents 







Paradigm I: God, the Son, and the Law 
 The first paradigm of Christian moral history precedes the creation of all 
agents; only God and the Son exist. The first verse of the Gospel of John reads, “In 
the beginning was the word and the word was with God and the word was God” 
(KJV, John 1:1). This verse alludes to a time when only the word—commonly 
identified as the Son—and God existed. If the word is roughly equivalent to the law, 
“unchangeable,” then only God and the law exist; yet God is a very particular moral 
agent because he “judgs‟t always right,” that is, he has perfect reason(III: 127, 155). 
God‟s perfect reason suggests that he is a moral agent in perfect harmony with the 
moral law and can perceive the “good” without impediment. This harmony does 
present a difficulty in relation to all other moral paradigms because God‟s agency is 
not plagued by some form of uncertainty, and it begs the question about why this era 
should be classified as a moral paradigm at all. However, despite the differences, this 
first paradigm presents the ideal model upon which all subsequent paradigms are 
based.  That is, all other agents aspire to God‟s moral example. Indeed, Milton claims 
in de Doctrina Christiana
1
 that it is God‟s relationship to the law which allows 
morality to exist at all, without which it would be “mere arbitrary opinion” (1146). 
This means that while the first moral paradigm is unlike any other in terms of 
epistemology and agency, it is critical in understanding the relationship between 
moral agents, the moral law.  
 The relationship between God and the word, which in this case is useful to 
think about as the law, is complicated by the paradox in St. John‟s Gospel. First, the 
                                                 
1
 In de Doctrina Christiana Milton explains that God is needed for the law to be necessarily 
binding and not arbitrary. 
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law is derived from God, which is to say that it is God‟s word that John speaks of.  
Second, the law and God are coeternal, and one and the same thing. These two 
propositions present a paradox because the first seems to suggest causation, or at least 
a temporal division between them. However, the second proposition denies any 
temporal distinction between these two objects. Indeed, it is difficult to maintain the 
independence of the law if they are coeternal since there does not seem to be any way 
of detecting difference. However, the law is a necessary condition for anything to 
exist independent of God—as opposed to the “artificial Adam” that Milton speaks of 
in Areopagitica. The law that operates independently of God is, as Merrit Hughes 
suggests in his article “Merit in Paradise Lost,”
 2
 the Son as the “creating word of St. 
John‟s Gospel;” for the word is what allows there to be an ontological division 
between something as banal as “up and down” and as pointed as “good and evil.” 
Therefore, the Son as the „word” is a necessary condition for creation, making the law 
and God coeternal in relation to the created universe, regardless of temporal 
structures retroactively applied to the relationship between God and the law.  
 In establishing the independence of creation, the law also establishes its own 
independence from the will of God, at least in part. God can change the law insofar as 
he can add to it by divine decree, as he does in the revelation of the Son and naming 
him vicegerent. However, God cannot change the law once it is issued, for in 
reference to the relationship between his foreknowledge and free acts of will, God 
says that he cannot “revoke the high decree / unchangeable” in order to avoid Adam 
and Eve‟s deception and fall (III: 126-27). If he did change it, Adam and Eve would 
                                                 
2
 Meritt Hughes discusses the meritocracy in heaven according to individual moral 
achievement in his article, “Merit in Paradise Lost” Huntington Library Quarterly 31.1 (University of 
California Press, 1967) 3. 
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cease to be moral agents and would “serve necessity” not God. This means that even 
though the law is derived from God, once it is articulated it becomes independent of 
his will in the sense that it is unaffected by any subsequent whims or desires and 
coincides with his plan for the universe. The unchangeable nature of the law 
establishes its independence from God‟s will and in turn makes God a free agent, 
albeit one with perfect reason and knowledge of the law, which means they are in 
perfect harmony. This problem is far from solved, but this basic idea allows Milton to 
cast God as a free moral agent while maintaining his essential, unchanging nature 
represented in scripture.  
 However, because God is in perfect harmony with the law his status as an 
agent free to choose his actions becomes questionable. In his article “To Act of Not,” 
Stephen Fallon elaborates on the paradox of “whether God‟s actions are freely chosen 
or made necessary and inevitable as expressions of goodness” (429)
3
. Either, God has 
no freedom of choice, which we learn in de Doctrina Milton rejects; or, God‟s acts 
are good because he does them, which makes them “mere arbitrary opinion” (de 
Doctina, 1146). Fallon elaborates on a third option suggesting that Milton avoids both 
of these unpleasant conclusions. Basically, Fallon points out that the paradox assumes 
that there can be only one good action when an agent is faced with a moral event. If 
there are multiple good actions in a given event, like whether to create the universe or 
not, then God can choose between a number of actions all valued as good. The only 
limiting factor in this formulation would have to be that the action that he does take 
fits his ideal plan for creation which means that action is not made necessary by its 
                                                 
3
 Stephen Fallon explores God‟s capacity for freedom in the moral context of Paradise Lost, 
“‟To Act or Not‟: Milton‟s Conception of Divine Freedom” Journal of the History of Ideas 49.3 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988) 429. 
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moral value, but is chosen based on how it serves God‟s pre-history “eternal purpose” 
(III: 172). 
 Fallon explicates God‟s freedom of choice by using as a case-study the 
creation of the earth in Book VII of Paradise Lost; however, God‟s reaction to the 
impending fall of humanity dramatizes his moral agency and demonstrates the 
particulars of the first moral paradigm. Whether it is meant to model moral reason to 
the reader or to the angels, the episode shows God identifying a moral situation, 
evaluating the alternatives and finally determining a course of action. His discussion 
of the agency of the “Ethereal Powers / and Spirits” (all created moral agents) 
culminates in a moral choice of his own: “man therefore shall find grace, / the other 
none” (III; 31-32). God‟s judgment here constitutes a moral action because he strives 
to maintain “mercy and justice” and, by extension, his “eternal purpose” (III:132, 
172). It seems that “mercy and justice” are assigned to the first parents and Satan 
respectively. Indeed, the last line of his speech, “but mercy first and last shall 
brightest shine,” suggests humanity will receive only mercy because they fall 
deceived (134). 
 After God finishes his first judgment, the Son presses him for what his mercy 
toward man entails, and asks whether he will “abolish thy creation, and unmake” 
humanity (III: 163). However, for the Son this option would mean defeat because 
God‟s “goodness and … greatness both / be questioned and blasphemed without 
defense” (165-66). In other words, Satan would succeed in either perverting humanity 
or unmaking that which God has made for his own glory. In response, God qualifies 
the mercy he referred to before, yet now it seems to take on a slightly different tenor. 
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He explains that “man should not quite be lost, but saved who will” (173). God is 
now saying that humanity will receive conditional mercy rather than the 
unconditional mercy implied in God‟s earlier proclamation. There is a subtle shift in 
God‟s attitude toward man from his first statement claiming mercy first and last shall 
brightest shine” and “man shall not quite be lost” (III: 134, 173). This shift from the 
implication of unconditional mercy to mercy with the condition of a fitting sacrifice 
and the curse of death reveals the difference between God‟s desires and his will to 
follow the law of the divine plan. That is, there is tension between mercy as the 
“brightest” divine virtue and the claim that man must die—“die he or justice must” 
(210).  
 The shift in God‟s judgment shows that God is capable of having a desire that 
diverges from the law, though he decides instead to uphold justice “as God‟s eternal 
purpose has decreed” (172). The separation of God‟s desire and his action is a facet of 
the anthropomorphization of the divine in Paradise Lost, but the fact that God is able 
to desire a course of action and choose the “just” option demonstrates his status as a 
free moral agent and gestures at the structure of the first moral paradigm. The 
paradigm remains nebulous both because it is not directly represented in the text, and 
because, as Milton admits, it is beyond human comprehension. However, the dialogue 
between God and the Son dramatizes God‟s engagement with the moral world and 
shows that it is similar to other types of agents in subsequent paradigms. God‟s 
privileged epistemological status means that this paradigm cannot fit into available 
normative moral structures developed by moral agents whose existence is derived 
from God. Further, God‟s perfect reason shows his ability to choose the “just” course 
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of action, cursing humanity with death despite the desire to grant unconditional 
mercy. His refusal to give in to his desire demonstrates not only his commitment to 
his plan, but also how to engage with the moral world.  
 
Paradigm II: The Angelic Host 
 The second paradigm in Christian moral history presented in Paradise Lost 
comes with the creation of the angels, the first third party apart from God and the law. 
The angels have a unique relationship to God and the law because they have different 
epistemological access to the law, so the process by which they interpret the moral 
world is also different. Their different epistemological access to the moral law is best 
evidenced by Abdiel‟s interpretation of his origin, having been told of his own 
creation. In turn, this means that the freedom that the angels enjoy is different from 
that of God‟s. God‟s freedom exists in complete knowledge which gives him the 
ability to balance virtue through moral reasoning, as he does in Book III in the 
judgment of Adam and Eve. The angels‟ freedom, on the other hand, consists of 
interpreting the moral world and having the ability to choose otherwise, also through 
the use of reason. These two approaches are similar, but they have a key difference: 
God chooses to act in a way that coincides with his “eternal purpose,” because to act 
otherwise would fundamentally change existence, while the angels choose whether or 
not to act in accordance with that purpose. In other words, the angels ought to choose 
to act according to God‟s purpose as it is revealed to them.  
 Moral action, for Milton, is based on reason: the agent interprets the moral 
situation, identifies the “moral” choice, and ideally takes action accordingly. 
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However, given that reason is the mechanism of moral activity there must be 
something that makes one action more just than another—that is, there must be some 
force of logical necessity that makes one action better than another. This is 
determined by logical necessity implicit throughout the poem, but articulated most 
clearly by Abdiel, who links it to causation and its laws. In other words, because God 
created the angels, he causes their existence. This particular type of physical 
causation brings with it an abstract moral relationship between the creator and the 
created. The creature is morally obligated to act in accordance with the creator‟s 
established final cause—or “eternal purpose.” This is the foundation of Abdiel‟s 
argument establishing sufficient reason that angels should obey God‟s decrees, new 
or old.  
 Satan seems to think that if God introduces new decrees regarding the moral 
law, then the law changes according to God‟s desires and is therefore arbitrary. 
Abdiel counters Satan‟s argument with an attempt to establish a logical argument 
from creation, which would direct angelic duty with moral force. In other words, 
Satan, in the beginning of this scene, argues against God‟s right to issue decrees, 
while Abdiel makes the argument that angels are bound by moral duty to follow those 
decrees because God created them and knows how to further perfect them. When 
Satan denies this, Abdiel echoes God, calling Satan an “ingrate;” also circumventing 
Satan‟s argument by pointing out that his assertion poses a non-question, given the 
fact that the angels owe their existence to God (V: 811). In other words, the angels are 
obligated to follow the law insofar as they freely fulfill the offices for which they 
were created or assigned, because God created them. For Abdiel, and seemingly for 
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Milton, the obligation that moral agents owe God is a matter of logical necessity that 
follows from the idea of beneficent creation and limits subjective interpretations of 
the good. It seems as though Abdiel casts God in an even more tyrannical light than 
Satan, saying that obedience is compulsory because he created them.  Yet Abdiel 
draws back from this by reminding Satan of their experience with God, who has 
always worked for the improvement of his creations. 
 To a large extent, Abdiel derives the “right of merit” that Hughes discusses in 
his article, “Merit in Paradise Lost,” from the act of creation (3). The equality that 
Abdiel uses to denounce Satan‟s proposal of angelic rule is based in the ontological 
status as fellow creatures rather than creators. When Abdiel says, “as by his Word the 
mighty father made / all things, ev‟n thee, and all the Spirits of Heaven / by him 
created” he draws attention to what stratifies or hierarchizes the host of heaven 
dividing them between God and the Son, and the angelic host (V: 836-38). The Son‟s 
right to rule is based on him being the creating word of God. This means that Satan‟s 
first mistake is to misperceive the logical relationships contained within the concept 
of creation; then, he works hard to refute Abdiel in order to release himself from the 
obligation entailed in creation. Abdiel clarifies the moral relationship between angels 
and God when he says “his laws our laws, all honor to him done / returns our own,” 
which means that freely fulfilling the offices for which the angels were assigned or 
created is what it means for an angel to act morally (844-45). In other words, to fulfill 
God‟s divine plan for creation whether it is understood or not, constitutes following 
both the moral law and the law of obligation entailed in the concept of creation. 
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 Satan retaliates against the appeal to creation by demanding “proof” and 
asking “who saw / when this creation was? Rememberst thou / thy making while the 
Maker gave thee being?” (856). Effectively, Satan applies a logically sound 
epistemological skepticism to Abdiel‟s appeal to creation, yet his mistake comes 
when he moves from skepticism to his assertion that angels are “self-begot, self-
raised / by their own quickening power‟ (860-61). Misguided though his conclusion 
is, Satan is attempting to undermine the idea of moral obligation to God by removing 
creation as the motivating force. Self-created beings would be justified in rebelling 
against God because it would affirm Satan‟s tyrannical portrait of God. Satan‟s logic 
here is that self-created beings have no obligation to any other beings, though he is 
not exactly correct in this assumption. It seems that God himself feels that he is 
obligated to remain consistent with his “eternal purpose” so as not to fundamentally 
change the angels and the rest of existence, though this obligation is of a very 
different quality than the one that binds Satan and the angels.  
 The obligation that is at the center of Satan and Abdiel‟s debate speaks to the 
nature of this paradigm‟s normative structure as a particular kind of virtue ethics. 
Satan is called an “ingrate” on a number of occasions, which suggests that the 
obligation manifests itself as gratitude; or rather, that the appropriate moral emotion 
for angels and all created agents is gratitude toward God. Gratitude in this case 
becomes like temperance or charity in that it is an ideal attitude to cultivate. Because 
Abdiel claims that the obligation that obtains on a relationship between creature and 
creator precludes other moral considerations like divine decrees, the second moral 
paradigm in Paradise Lost is a brand of virtue ethics. It is tempting to think of it as 
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deontology instead because the command to bow before the Son constitutes a specific 
moral law, and the angels cannot penetrate the entire logic of the revelation of the Son 
and naming him vicegerent; however, Abdiel locates the force of their morality in a 
virtue and in their moral character in fulfilling their moral duty. Abdiel‟s argument 
and understanding of the concept of creation and its moral implications shows that the 
paradigm is dominated by an emphasis on moral character and acting according to 
moral ideals, which means that it can best be categorized as virtue ethics. 
 
Paradigm III: The Creation of Humanity 
 The creation of humanity marks the beginning of a new era of moral history 
defined by a new moral agent, humanity, and its relationship to both moral law and to 
God. God commanded the first parents, in Adam‟s words: “not to taste that only Tree 
/ of knowledge … God pronounced it death to taste that Tree” (423-27). In essence, 
humanity and the angels were both asked to obey God—as dictated by the law of 
obligation. However, while the angels received the commandment of fealty to the Son 
after their creation, Adam and Eve were given their single commandment almost at 
their creation. Because the respective laws given to humans and angels came at 
different times in relation to their own creation the normative structures of each 
paradigm is different. As a result, and in the context of the paradigmatical structures 
of Paradise Lost, the garden can best be categorized as deontological, whereas the 
angels‟ structure is virtue ethical. The capacity for this paradigm to fit into other 
normative moral structures diminishes with the realization that the moral agents to 
which this law pertains—Adam and Eve—do not understand the complex meanings 
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contained within the single law that subsequent biblical commentators will explore. 
However, Adam and Eve‟s understanding is not required for the law to be binding. 
The law of obligation remains the basis for moral law in Paradise Lost as it 
shows up in both Raphael‟s account of the creation of the world in Book VII and in 
Adam‟s account of his own creation in Book VIII. The law of obligation, seemingly a 
remnant of the preceding structure of virtue ethics, persists because it remains the 
necessary force which morally compels Adam and Eve to follow the law, and, at least 
in part, is what makes disobedience wrong. Despite the consistent logical backdrop of 
the law of obligation, this paradigm changes the previous moral paradigm 
significantly.  Raphael straddles the divide between them saying: 
 
For which to the infinitely God we owe 
Immortal thanks, and his admonishment 
Receive with solemn purpose to observe 
Immutably his sov‟reign will, the end 
Of what we are. (VII, 76-80) 
 
The “immortal thanks” that is owed to the “infinitely God” is the motivating force 
that underwrites the law of obligation for moral agents created by God. Indeed, 
Raphael says that the expression of gratitude for being is the purpose for the moral 
agents‟ being, at least in part, since their job is to “observe” divine will. This is true 
both in the sense that angels and humans participate in moral agency which is at least 
structurally similar to God‟s, and that they obey his decrees. Therefore, as Raphael 
explains, the law of obligation entailed in creation persists for Adam and Eve in the 
garden. It seems that Milton is attempting to have it both ways by affirming virtue 
ethics and deontology. However, the law of obligation merely motivates the moral 
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system while the prohibition on the forbidden fruit dominates moral choice, which 
means that in regard to how moral agents engage with the moral world, the moral 
structure in the garden is deontological. 
Adam picks up the theme of gratitude, the appropriate moral emotion toward 
God, and its entailment from creation in his first moments of consciousness. 
Acknowledging his innate knowledge of language Adam echoes Satan‟s question 
about his own origin: 
 
 Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here? 
 Not of  myself; but some great maker then,  
 In goodness and in power pre-eminent; 
 Tell me, how may I know him, how adore him, 
 From whom I have that thus I move and live, 
 And feel that I am happier than I know. (277-82) 
 
Adam, like Satan, briefly entertains the idea that he was self-made; however, he soon 
concludes that he must have been created. His next concern is the nature of his creator 
and how he may best worship him. It seems that, like language, gratitude is innate in 
Adam‟s state of being. This would mean that Adam worships out of necessity and not 
out of devotion to his creator, which contradicts God‟s assertion of free-will in Book 
III. This is part of the basis for William Empson‟s the criticism of Milton‟s God, that 
he does not in fact allow for free-will, and rather uses humans and angels for the 
glorification of himself and the Son.
4
 However, it is Adam‟s brief echo of Satan and 
his subtle reasoning in this passage that solves this apparent problem. Adam chooses 
devotion to God rather than devotion to himself through the childlike reasoning he 
                                                 
4
 William Empson makes the case that God in Paradise Lost is not a traditional Christian 
image in his book Milton’s God. 
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employs. In fact, Adam is employing a simplified version of the teleological 
argument for the existence of God. The allusion to this sophisticated reasoning in this 
episode means that Adam‟s innate ability is reason and not gratitude
5
. In addition, if, 
as stated in the Areopagitica, “reason is but choosing,” then Adam freely enters into a 
relationship of moral obligation to God since he favors the explanation from design 
over the explanation of self-creation that Satan chooses in Book V. 
 Given that Adam freely enters into this moral paradigm the birth of the moral 
agenton earth in Raphael‟s exposition of the creation of the world further elucidates 
the paradigm in the Garden of Eden. Raphael vaguely gestures at the bounty that God 
created for Adam, yet focuses on the creation of the forbidden tree. The implication is 
that the tree is the center-piece of God‟s bounty because it represents the gift of 
choice and therefore reason. God‟s role in the creation of the tree and the gift of 
reason makes him the ultimate source of both good and evil; however, the burden is 
on Adam to act according to God‟s plan; if he does so he will remain free from evil. 
God is exonerated from fault for evil‟s presence in the world because Adam was 
created in a context that allowed him to seek the knowledge of good and evil, even 
though it comes with the cost of death for him and his progeny. Adam and Eve‟s 
compliance with the single law represents obedience to God‟s eternal purpose which 
in turn means that their actions are, like God‟s, in harmony with the moral law.   
 The fall, however, represents the idea of freedom as it is tied to the concept of 
capability. If Adam and Eve begin “knowing good by evil,” they are acquainted with 
evil and are no longer capable of existing in their paradise (Areopagitica, 939). When 
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 Milton asserts the teleological argument, or argument from design, in the first chapter of de 
Doctrina Christiana as an axiom of the work that follows. 
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Adam recalls the commandment not to eat of the tree, God says that the consequence 
is death:  
 
“The day thou eat‟st thereof…inevitably thou shalt die; 
From that day mortal, and this happy state  
Shalt lose, expelled from hence into a world 
Of woe and sorrow” (VIII, 329-33)  
 
However, he goes on to define exactly what death is, since in a prelapsarian existence 
“death” is a signifier with no signified. This passage does two things: first, it attempts 
to acquaint Adam, a priori, with a concept he knows nothing of, and second, it points 
out a practical concern that is hidden within the single law. If Adam and Eve “know” 
evil after the fall, it is quite possible that they would no longer be able to coexist with 
paradise. Since they would then be imperfect beings, they are not only prevented 
from persisting in their “happy state,” but incapable of it in the same way they are 
incapable of truly understanding the consequence of disobedience. 
 Here again, Adam and Eve‟s inability to penetrate the logic of the single 
prohibitory law, and their limited understanding of the law of obligation, affirm the 
deontological structure in this paradigm. If Adam and Eve are incapable of existing in 
the Garden after they know evil, and they are incapable of engaging a priori with 
postlapsarian concepts like death, then the epistemological gap between the two 
paradigms means human intellect is incapable of penetrating the moral structure in 
the Garden of Eden. The epistemological gap means that they abide by the single law 
that is given to them by God because it is given to them by God, their creator, who 
has shown himself to be beneficent through the bounty of creation. Adam freely 
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enters into this moral obligation through teleological reasoning; however, it also 
shows that over and above the law of obligation is a single prohibitive law that need 
not be understood aside from the fact that if the action is taken, it bears consequences. 
In other words, Raphael and Adam‟s exposition of creation, especially in Books VII 
and VIII, shows that Adam and Eve are placed within a deontological normative 
structure with a single law. While the angels do eventually receive a similar specific 
law in the revelation of the Son, humanity existed in a deontological paradigm from 
its creation, as opposed to the virtue ethical paradigm that preceded the creation of 
Earth. 
 
Paradigm IV: East of the Garden 
 Paradise Lost makes specific mention of the earth‟s change that results from 
Eve‟s consumption of the forbidden fruit. “Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her 
seat / sighing through all her works gave signs of woe / that all was lost” (IX, 782-
84). Since the Earth and Nature are irrevocably changed, Adam and Eve now exist in 
a different world governed by a different natural and moral law. While this new 
structure has not been articulated in Book IX, the fall marks the beginning of a new 
moral era that is pervaded by minor paradigm shifts. In fact, the Old Testament 
encompasses a number of moral fluctuations that makes this era of moral history 
difficult to characterize because, as Book XI shows, presents a tumultuous period of 
moral success and failure, yet according to Milton, it begins with a return to virtue 
ethics for Adam and Eve. However, the paradigm moves on to the law as articulated 
to Noah and changes again when it takes the form of Mosaic Law. These milestones 
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in the moral history in the Old Testament are merely a few of the more major  shifts 
in normative moral structure, indeed this era can be characterized as a long period of 
moral fluctuation until it is stabilized with the Old Testament books of law. 
Adam and Eve‟s normative moral structure seems to be suspended in the latter 
half of Book X. Not until after they both lament the fall and combine their skill in 
moral reasoning does it become clear what kind of moral paradigm exists once the 
deontological singularity is dissolved by the transgression of the single 
commandment. In a sense, Adam and Eve find themselves in a sort of moral vacuum. 
They have no conception of what the normative moral structure looks like, and they 
are surprised and confused that they have not died—what ever “death” means they do 
not seem to have experienced it yet. The dialogue between the first parents finally 
indicates that they have, in essence, defaulted to virtue ethics, because Adam and Eve 
engage in moral reasoning like that which is espoused in the Areopagitica. Adam first 
conceives of death as a return to dust, and therefore oblivion, which he sees as a 
release from both the immediate pain that he is now subject to, and the curses from 
his progeny. However, after he reconciles with Eve, she proposes that they seek death 
to prevent the suffering of the ensuing generations. Eve‟s proposal is a surprising 
embrace of utilitarianism; however, Adam rebuts Eve‟s utilitarian solution with a 
recognition of a greater good in allowing justice to come full circle when the Son 
returns to crush their enemy‟s head
6
. This episode shows Adam and Eve‟s evolving 
                                                 
6
 Eve‟s turn to utilitarianism seems to be overshadowed by Adam‟s proposal of allowing the 
sacrifice of the Son to come to fruition as a utilitarian guesture itself. However, Adam‟s argument does 
not follow from the greatest good for the greatest number, but rather in its place in God‟s divine plan. 
Eve‟s proposal, on the other hand, values the least suffering for the greatest number and is therefore 
based in utilitarian sentiments. 
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moral reasoning, which in turn indicates what type of moral structure in which they 
now find themselves. 
In Book III, God says he will “clear their senses dark” and restore their reason 
after the fall (188). However, Adam, with reason alone, is incapable of locating the 
“good” since he could do nothing but curse and wish for death. Eve, on the other 
hand, arrives at her utilitarian proposal which seeks to prevent the suffering of 
humankind. Eve‟s logic is not unsound: the prevention of suffering is a moral good.  
However, Adam‟s conclusion that allowing the suffering so that an even “greater 
good” can be attained is the superior moral judgment. In other words, the discernment 
that Adam and Eve exhibit together is very similar to the discernment outlined in 
Areopagitica, since they are capable of recognizing a greater good that results from a 
repulsive action—to allow all the generations of humanity to suffer. If Adam and 
Eve, with their moral discernment, are capable of the same actions as those 
articulated in Areopagitica, then Adam and Eve are in a similar moral paradigm; that 
is, they find themselves in a  normative moral structure of virtue ethics, like Milton‟s 
own moral era. 
While Adam and Eve can apparently maintain virtue ethics during their 
lifetime, Books XI and XII show the degradation of this structure and the rise of a 
prescriptive law. Cain is banished after the first murder and he presumably functions 
in the same system in which Adam and Eve function. Eventually, Noah is found to be 
the only one able to maintain such discernment when he “preached / conversion and 
repentance as the souls / in prison under judgments immanent” (XI, 723-25). The 
flood, then, purges humanity and allows it to start anew in a “long time of peace,” a 
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peace that is broken by Nimrod. The paradigm that is roughly equivalent to the Old 
Testament is typified by the ebb and flow of success in virtue ethics until the 
paradigm is stabilized by the Mosaic Law. Michael explains that the law exists to 
“evince / their natural pravity,” which means it is meant to educate humanity both 
about evil, and about their potential for evil. In other words, the introduction of 
Mosaic Law dominates the period after the fall with the purpose to teach humanity to 
“discover sin” (XII, 291). 
The ebb and flow between long periods of peace—or harmony with God‟s 
eternal purpose—and discord is seen in a number of episodes revealed to Adam, 
including the lead up to the flood and the tyranny of Nimrod. This marks the period 
between the fall and the establishment of Mosaic Law as a period of varying success 
in virtue ethics. It seems that humanity‟s “dark senses,” though “cleared” by God, are 
easily corrupted, and therefore, they have trouble discerning right from wrong. Milton 
states in the Areopagitica that, “good and evil we know in the field of this world grow 
up together almost inseparably,” so it is no wonder that the moral agents just after the 
fall have little success in maintaining the virtue ethical structure (938). Milton 
continues saying that “the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the 
knowledge of evil;” however, Adam‟s confusion about the concept of death 
demonstrates that moral agency is still in its nascent stages because of humanity‟s 
limited knowledge and experience on which to base their moral discernment (938). In 




The solution to the chaotic ebb and flow of humanity‟s success with virtue 
ethics is Mosaic Law. The rigid deontological structure is meant to produce the 
knowledge necessary for independent moral discernment. Michael explains that the 
deontological Mosaic Law that dominates the Old Testament will “resign [humanity] 
in full time / up to a better covenant” (XII, 301-2). The covenant to which Michael 
refers here is the coming of the Son, or the New Testament, the period of moral 
history about which Milton wrote the Areopagitica. Therefore, Milton makes Old 
Testament law the forge in which moral agency is tempered, and thus capable of 
cutting through “shadowy types of truth” to “discover sin” (XII, 303; 290).  
Michael describes the transition from the Old Testament to the New as: 
 
 …from flesh to spirit 
 From imposition of strict laws to free 
 Acceptance of large grace, from servile fear 
 To filial, works of law to works of faith” (XII, 303-06) 
 
This begins to bridge the gap in continuity between the Old and New Testament in 
Milton‟s writing; but first it gives insight into the Old Testament paradigm. The vast 
majority of history in this paradigm happens after the “imposition of strict laws,” and 
therefore is characterized as “servile fear” in relation to God, and “works of law” in 
relation to the law (XII, 304-6). Moral agents, as a result, are meant to freely choose 
whether or not to act morally according to the general guidelines of the law. Under 
Mosaic Law an agent‟s moral discernment is engaged in two ways, first, to reverse-
engineer moral truth from what is stated in the law, and second, to determine how the 
law applies to a given moral situation. Milton‟s rejection of humanity‟s status as 
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“under a perpetual childhood of prescription,” seems to conflict with this structure if 
it is interpreted as a restriction on human reason; however, as Michael points out, this 
is precisely the purpose for Mosaic Law (Areopagitica, 938). However, it does show 
a paradigm that is typified by “works of law,” and the moral law is therefore in place 
to identify what the moral is so that moral agents can successfully maintain harmony 
with God‟s eternal purpose while limiting the danger of moral reason going astray. 
Michael‟s explanation for the existence of the law, as something to educate 
moral agents that are inexpert at moral judgment, shows the deontological nature of 
the paradigm. While deontology does not necessarily mean that moral agents are 
ignorant of the truth behind moral law, the moral value is firmly located in moral 
action and taken out of the moral agent because the agent cannot penetrate moral 
truth. In the Garden, Adam and Eve do have a single prescriptive law, yet in the 
ensuing history in Books XI and XII, humanity has proven itself incapable of 
managing good and evil in a system governed by virtue ethics. As a result, 
humanity‟s capacity to discern right from wrong is subordinated to the moral law 
given to them by God. This paradigm contrasts with the rest of moral history in that it 
guides moral reason, which can be seen as an infringement on the freedom of moral 
reasoning advocated in Milton‟s other works, and which would represent an obstacle 
for continuity in Christian moral history. 
The paradigm after the fall of humanity is a strong version of deontology 
because humanity has proven itself incapable of maintaining a virtue ethical moral 
system. Mosaic Law, which dominates this paradigm, was established in an effort to 
stabilize the chaotic fluctuations in this moral paradigm from Adam and Eve to the 
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establishment of God‟s law through Moses. This period of flux represents a 
microcosm for why Kuhn‟s theory about scientific revolution is relevant. If the law is 
in place to educate moral agents about good and evil, then morality, like the scientific 
method, is a process rather than a coherent object. The fluctuations then represent 
how morality is not merely a steady march of progress, but a fluid process more 
analogous to feedback loops. This more fluid understanding of moral history remains 
true in all the paradigms as they are portrayed in Paradise Lost, save the first because 
the relationship between God and the law is constant; however, the final paradigm, 
after the coming of the Son, marks the transition to what Michael calls, a “better 
covenant,” in which moral agents are returned to a virtue ethical structure and are 
capable of reclaiming their moral discernment and reason, having graduated from the 
deontology that dominates the paradigm in the Old Testament. 
 
Paradigm V: The New Convenant 
 Michael justifies the Mosaic Law by claiming it will “evince [humanity‟s] 
natural pravity…that when they see / law can discover sin” which means when, “in 
full time,” humanity graduates from the deontological normative moral structure of 
the Old Testament, humans are now expected to “discover sin” as free agents (XII: 
287-90). The incarnation of the Son marks this graduation, and for Joachim of Fiore 
begins the second age of moral history. However, in Paradise Lost the fifth paradigm 
begins with a return to virtue ethics. Because this is the paradigm in which Milton 
writes Areopagitica the structures should be fairly similar, his moral philosophy 
presented therein mirrors the anticipation of the fifth paradigm in Book XII of 
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Paradise Lost. Therefore, this age of moral history sees an increase in moral agency 
and a shift in the locus of moral value from the event and into the moral character and 
the consequence derived from moral action. 
In Book XII, the fifth paradigm is anticipated in an explanation of the purpose 
for the Mosaic Law.  
 
 So law appears imperfect, and but giv‟n 
 With purpose to resign them in full time 
 Up to a better cov‟nant, disciplined 
 From shadowy types of truth, from flesh to spirit, 
From imposition of strict laws to free 
Acceptance of large grace, from servile fear 
To filial, works of law to works of faith. (300-06) 
 
Now that humanity is “disciplined,” capable of discerning moral truth, they can enter 
a period characterized by the “spirit” and “free / acceptance of large grace” (XII, 303-
05). The emphasis on spirit echoes Joachim‟s final age. However, Milton‟s 
construction is congruent with Joachim‟s history in that the Old Testament is 
characterized by law while human agency is still in its infancy. Only when this 
discipline is acquired can humanity transition from a paradigm based on “works of 
law” to a paradigm based on “works of faith.” 
The difference between “works of law” and “works of faith” can be derived 
from Milton‟s rejection of paternalistic moral law in the Areopagitica. The purpose of 
Mosaic Law, according to Michael, is to “remove sin by removing the matter of sin,” 
since it reveals sin to moral agents otherwise incapable of identifying it (944). 
However, Milton lambastes this justification for law. He argues that moral agents, in 
the fifth paradigm, do not follow the paternalistic law, but an internal law of 
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conscience. Performing “works of faith,” are the actions of the “warfarring Christian” 
and the “wise man” described in the Areopagitica, which means that the fifth 
paradigm also emphasizes moral empiricism and experimentation. Because Milton‟s 
exemplary moral agents are not under “pittance, and prescription, and compulsion” of 
a rigid moral law they now have to investigate the moral world through a process 
similar to the scientific method. Moral agents are now not only capable of identifying 
evil and preferring good, but can test their moral senses and even derive good out  of 
potentially harmful moral materials. As a result, agency sees a dramatic increase in 
the New Testament since, as I have argued, Milton is a virtue ethical consequentialist 
because he emphasizes moral character and good consequences from potentially 
harmful materials. 
The emphasis on moral character is communicated with a clearer description 
of the “law of faith” that typifies the age of spirit that Joachim of Fiore presents and 
Milton echoes.  
 
 …and the law of faith 
 Working through love, upon their hearts shall write,  
 To guide them in all truth, and also arm 
 With spiritual armor, able to resist 
 Satan‟s assaults” (XII: 487-92) 
 
The central tenet of the “law of faith” and, by extension, the fifth paradigm, is love. 
Love is the mental state by which the good obtains in a moral action; however, the 
range of possibilities for an expression of love is vast. To satisfy this ambiguity, the 
moral value is displaced from the action, where it had been located in the last 
paradigm, and placed in the moral agent. The “law of faith” is then written on the 
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hearts of humanity placing the guide to the moral good within the moral agent itself. 
Therefore, the guiding force in the moral structure is more of a principle than a 
concrete legalistic statement. Thus to act morally is to act in the “spirit” of the moral 
good.  
Since the “law of faith” is motivated by love the burden of identification of 
the moral good rests firmly on the agent. Indeed, the role of love seems to serve as a 
short-hand for the law of obligation, the logical duty or fealty that each moral agent 
should hold for his or her creator. While the Mosaic Law was meant to “evince” and 
“stir up,” the “law of faith” is meant to “guide,” which demonstrates the transition 
from the “perpetual prescription” of Old Testament deontology to a system of virtue 
ethics. Moreover, the law of faith gives moral agents “spiritual armor,” indicating that 
it defends against “Satan‟s assaults,” but does not discern good moral action or 
combat evil in their stead. The present absence here is that the law of love does not 
give them a two-handed sword like Michael‟s in the war in heaven, but protective 
armament. In addition, moral agents are now capable of acting in the “spirit of the 
law,” rather than according to the law, and can derive good out of evil, at least to 
some extent.  
When in Book XII Adam recognizes the Son‟s ability to create good out of 
evil in his sacrifice, he also recognizes the spirit of Milton‟s consequentialism. 
Human moral agents, as they are represented in the Areopagitica, are capable of 
deriving moral truth from potentially harmful materials. While the Son can create 
good out of evil, humanity can merely derive moral truth from potential evil. 
Humanity‟s capacity for moral consequences exists on a much smaller scale; yet the 
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law of faith is clearly no longer prescriptive. Moral agents are capable of 
manipulating their moral world by deriving good from evil through a kind of 
empiricism and experimentation outlined in the Areopagitica. Therefore, when Adam 
exclaims “o goodness infinite, goodness immense” in reference to the Son‟s 
superlative good act of self-sacrifice, he echoes the infinite possibilities for 
expression of moral good through the love that the Son shows humanity (XII, 469). 
Indeed, it seems that in the spirit of the law of faith, humanity can, like the Son, “all 
this good of evil … produce / and evil turn to good” (XII, 470-71). If good can come 
from evil, then the event itself cannot contain the moral value; rather the consequence 
of that action is the determining factor in the moral value of a given circumstance. As 
a result, the fifth paradigm, after the incarnation of the Son, becomes a virtue ethical 
moral system based heavily in consequentialism since it emphasizes moral character 
and the consequence that character can derive from a given moral situation. 
In short, the fifth paradigm exhibits a virtue ethics system that emphasizes a strong 
moral character that can manipulate the moral world. Because moral agents can 
manipulate moral circumstance, moral value is transferred from the action to the 
consequence from that action. The paradigms separated by the incarnation of the Son 
differ greatly in their normative moral structures. The consequentialism that the Son 
introduces to humanity is diametrically opposed to the deontological paradigm of the 
Old Testament. This paradigm also sees the relocation of moral value from the moral 
action to the moral agent, while in the preceding paradigm; the value of the action 
was paramount. This transition in moral value is shown in the transition from “works 
of law” to “works of faith.” Humanity is now given both the ability and burden to 
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discern between good and evil, derive good from evil materials, and act freely in the 




Chapter II: The Recurrence of Agency in Paradise Lost 
 The analysis of the moral history represented in Paradise Lost in the last 
chapter shows dramatic paradigm shifts in morality in Christian history. The 
oscillation in the relationship between the agent and the moral law means that 
Milton‟s historical construction is non-linear. As a result, Kuhn‟s theory of the history 
of scientific revolutions—that history is marked by paradigm shifts more closely 
resembling feedback loops than a crescendo of progress—offers a useful way to 
conceptualize Milton‟s history of morality and unite the apparently incompatible 
structural forms that morality takes during the course of Christian history. However, 
the lack of a linear progression causes a problem. It seems that continuity along the 
timeline of moral history suffers, which is a concern because, it is difficult to 
maintain the immutability of God if the history of his creation is inconsistent. 
 In other words, the problem lies in the tension between these paradigms. Each 
paradigm is consistent when analyzed synchronically. But, because moral history 
exhibits incompatible normative structures like deontology and consequentialism, a 
continuous diachronic view of this history seems to be unattainable. However, the 
same structure that throws this problem into sharp relief also offers a solution. If 
morality were a process, even when it consists of a body of laws centering on the 
agent, then the pursuit of moral truth is analogous to the pursuit of scientific truth. 
Areopagitica presents exactly this type of moral philosophy, emphasizing empiricism 
and experimentation in the spirit of the law, rather than a strict adherence to a 
conception of a remote, perfect ideal. In constructing morality as a dynamic process 
Milton departs form Platonic philosophy and makes a case for consequentialism—the 
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belief that moral values are located in the result of a moral situation—and the 
philosophy in Areopagitica that centers on the moral agent‟s ability to progress 
through personal moral education. 
 The disparity between the Old and New Testament moral paradigms can be 
explained as a process of education. Adam demonstrates his lack of moral, and even 
physical, understanding when he confesses that he does not know what “death” 
means. He is cast into a world where death becomes a reality before he knows what 
this word signifies. Adam‟s limited success in understanding his vision of the Old 
Testament mirrors Michael‟s justification for the law when he states that the law is 
meant to “discover” evil and “discipline” him and his heirs against it, which begins to 
explain the relationship between the agent and the moral law (290; 302). Adam‟s 
struggle to understand coupled with the didactic purpose of moral law means that 
human agency is simply not powerful enough to grapple with sin and evil on its own. 
The paternalistic law of the Old Testament, then, shows humans the difference 
between good and evil until, in the New Testament, they are able to engage with 
morality directly armed with a posteriori knowledge since they now have the entirety 
of human history at their disposal. Moral agency, therefore, is that which establishes 
continuity though each moral paradigm. This chapter will explore how Paradise Lost 
demonstrates the form of moral agency discussed in Areopagitica and establishes 
continuity in Christian moral history. 
 The analysis of the moral paradigms in the previous chapter highlights the 
discontinuity in moral history. However, Milton‟s conception of moral agency in 
Areopagitica provides a central object around which to establish diachronic 
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continuity across the moral history presented in Paradise Lost. Kuhn‟s model for 
scientific revolutions using paradigm shifts is united around the scientific method and 
the search for truth. Milton‟s moral agent, then, is motivated in the same way as 
Kuhn‟s scientist. In Areopagitica Milton describes the “warfaring Christian” and the 
“wise man” who seek moral truth through experiencing both good and evil. Milton‟s 
moral empiricism and experimentation is part and parcel of his moral formulation 
when he asks “what were virtue but a name?” if that virtue were the result of 
“pittance, and prescription, and compulsion” serving necessity not God (944). The 
moral resolve of the agent, therefore, must be tested in order to have value. That is, 
the agent has to face both good and evil and prefer the good in order to obtain a 
positive value.  
 For Milton, reason is the most important element in determining moral value. 
In fact, reason is necessary to make an agent a moral agent. It follows from “reason is 
but choosing” and the preference of the good, that reason is necessary for an agent to 
engage in a moral event (944). The emphasis on reason is why agents who are under 
“pittance, and prescription, and compulsion” cannot be praised as moral agents for 
they are not engaging in true moral activity (944). This reveals a key difference 
between the Old and New Testaments. The emphasis on Mosaic Law in the analysis 
of this theological issue in Milton‟s works makes it seems that the Old Testament 
precludes choice by enforcing the type of compulsion that is denounced in 
Areopagitica, yet it would be absurd to say that the people of the Old Testament were 
not moral agents. The Old Testament is far more complicated, though the feature of 
Mosaic Law presents the biggest obstacle to continuity in moral history because its 
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emphasis seems to suggest a deemphasis of moral reason. While the complexities of 
The Old Testament moral paradigm require further exploration, this project is focused 
on the problem presented by the apparent paradox between strict laws and an the 
emphasis that Milton puts on moral reasoning. The inconsistency between the agency 
allowed by the Old and New Testaments can be solved by understanding that moral 
agency. Reason, then, is the faculty by which moral facts are assessed and chosen in 
both paradigms. Therefore, at any time during moral history agents demonstrate some 
manner of reason in order to be considered moral agents. 
 Milton‟s moral philosophy in Areopagitica goes further than the preference of 
one action over another, since the “warfarring Christian” and the “wise man” actively 
pursue moral truth (939).  
 
Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary 
to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the 
conformation of truth, how can we more sagely and with less danger scout 
into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and 
hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of 
books promiscuously read. (939) 
 
This passage expresses the empiricism and experimental dimension of Milton‟s moral 
agency. Agents test themselves against the moral world in an effort to investigate 
moral truth and are therefore asked to engage in a moral empirical project. Milton‟s 
“warfarring Christian” and “wise man” become moral scientists since moral truth is 
the result of continual testing and observation. 
 The moral empiricism and experimentation in this case makes agency so 
powerful that it allows agents to manipulate the moral world by changing the value of 
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a given event. If, as Milton argues, the agent is able to derive positive moral results 
from potentially harmful materials the moral event has a positive moral value. That is, 
if an agent discovers moral truth in the reading of pornography or libelous materials, 
the reading is still morally good. The truth that the agent derives in this situation 
becomes the focal point of the moral situation and could include: what should be 
avoided in their deeds and thoughts, why certain actions are evil, or it could increase 
knowledge of human nature, deceitfulness, and even how sinners deceive themselves. 
If, on the other hand, the reading of pornography merely increases the agent‟s 
licentious tendencies, then the moral event receives a negative value.  
 Therefore, Milton‟s moral philosophy is consequentialist and highly dynamic. 
He readily admits that not everyone will produce a positive value from potentially 
harmful materials, which means that morality is highly individualistic in Milton‟s 
view. Individualism of this kind is incompatible with the deontological structure of 
the Old Testament. Agency, then, differs in structure between the two moral 
paradigms, which is problematic if agency is the concept around which to center the 
reconciliation of the paradigms of moral history. However, Michael‟s explanation of 
Mosaic Law again becomes relevant because he reveals that the investigative work 
that Milton encourages in Areopagitica is merely reversed for the Old Testament 
moral agent. However, the important thing to realize here is that the same intellectual 
work is occurring in both moral paradigms. Though the identification of evil is 
reversed by the law, the agent still has to reverse engineer moral truth, apply that 
truth, and act accordingly, while in the New Testament the burden is on the agent to 
identify good and evil, and act accordingly. Michael, of course, also makes it clear 
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that the moral history dominated by Mosaic Law, with all its complexity, 
demonstrates that no system of moral law could be perfect but serves them well until 
they are able to accept Christ‟s broader teaching of love.  
 If Milton wants to establish continuity over the course of Christian moral 
history, then he has to connect all of the disparate paradigms presented in that history 
and bridge the gaps created by the different manifestations of moral agency. Milton, 
therefore, has developed his idea of the moral situation which obtains through the 
application of reason—meaning there must be a choice and by extension freedom. In 
addition, the choices involved must be identified as either good or evil, and of course, 
the agent must be aware of these choices. The centerpiece of this moral equation is 
the identification of the value of any given moral action. That is, the most important 
part of Milton‟s moral formulation is the interpretation of the moral world which 
allows agents to discern good from evil and even manipulate the value of certain 
actions. Incidentally, the act of interpreting the moral world occupies much of the 
action in Paradise Lost. Using the same structure established in chapter I the current 
chapter will now rehearse these moments and draw out the presence of agency that 
links the fragmented moral timeline. The incidents of moral interpretation will be 
highlighted in an attempt to uncover the moral agency present in the text and establish 
the continuity between the different paradigms of Christian moral history.  
 In his interpretation of God‟s freedom, Stephen Fallon claims that God can 
discern one good from another and choose one of many equivalent good actions.
 
The 
establishment of this equality is not explicitly stated in the text, yet God shows 
himself to desire one thing and choose another. Yet it would be inconsistent with the 
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identity of God to desire anything less than the superlative good, which means that 
the two actions must have equal value. The ability to choose allows God to have 
freedom without succumbing to arbitrariness and tyranny. The episode which shows 
this choice between two equivalent goods is not in the creation scene of Book VII but 
in the sentencing of humanity in Book III. God seems to say that humanity will be 
met with mercy, yet after the Son interjects, he changes his mind and seeks a sacrifice 
so that the demands of justice can be met.  
 However, God‟s identity also requires that he is omniscient, which means that 
he would have known all along what action had to be taken in regards to the first 
human transgression. It is puzzling why God would even have to debate the issue, let 
alone desire one action and choose another, since perfect knowledge would entail 
knowledge of what he would choose. What the episode does, however, is to dramatize 
the interpretation of the moral situation. God echoes the moral agency of 
Areopagitica as he prophecies humanity‟s fall. He emphasizes reason and freedom in 
calling Adam and Eve “authors to themselves in all / both in what they judge and 
what they choose” (122-23). In assessing the moral situation, which is the first step in 
God‟s judgment about humanity‟s impending fall, he calls attention to the act of 
judging a moral dilemma—or rather interpreting it. He eventually decides that, 
humanity “shall find grace” given the nature of man‟s lapse in judgment, since he 
“falls deceived” (130-31). God is accounting for the difference in the contexts of 
Satan‟s fall versus Adam and Eve‟s and therefore desires to grant them mercy.  
 However, it seems that the Son reminds God about justice when he says that 
he “judg'st always right” and God defers mercy pending a fitting sacrifice, so that 
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justice is appeased (155). In a sense, God changes his mind from unconditional mercy 
to conditional mercy, presumably to allow him to justify the entire history of human 
suffering in the face of God‟s perfect goodness. In effect, this means that God 
continues to interpret the moral situation throughout the scene and is aided by the 
dialogue with the Son. He has drawn attention to the interpretive error made by Adam 
and Eve, an interpretive process in which God is currently engaged with in this scene. 
His desire for unconditional mercy shows a dynamic, free moral agent as the scene 
becomes a drama staged to demonstrate God‟s perfect moral agency as it is defined in 
Areopagitica. God‟s agency, therefore, contrasts with both Satan and Adam and 
Eve‟s. These instances of flawed moral agency are revealed through an error of moral 
interpretation demonstrated in the debate between Satan and Abdiel in Book V, and in 
the dialogue between Eve and Satan in Book IX.  
 The second paradigm of moral history reflects God‟s accommodated moral 
agency found in the first. Satan and Abdiel‟s argument about their relationship to God 
and his law demonstrates the moral agency that persists throughout history. Again, 
agency requires the use of reason and interpretation in order to obtain in any given 
event. In the second paradigm, Abdiel and Satan articulate alternate interpretations of 
their existence and their relationship to God. Their disagreement about this 
relationship affects the legitimacy of God‟s status as sovereign and whether the 
angels are obligated to obey his law. Abdiel claims that because God created them, 
they owe him gratitude for their being, and are therefore obligated to remain loyal 
subjects. On the other hand, Satan claims that “[the angels] know no time when we 
were not as now” which means, given the evidence,  that angels, like God, are self-
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created is just as likely as the assumption that they were created by another. Satan and 
Abdiel‟s alternate interpretation not only determines their moral state of affairs but 
demonstrates their moral choices and establishes continuity between the first and 
second paradigms. 
 Abdiel articulates a traditional interpretation of Christian being, that his 
existence is the result of a conscious and free act of God. However, Satan points out 
that Abdiel‟s claim is a combination of faith and interpretation when he asks him to 
“remember thou / thy making, while the Maker gave thee being?” (857-58). Satan 
answers his own question when he says that they “know no time when they were not 
as now” (859). Satan is pointing out that no created being is conscious during their 
own creation, which means that they do not have first hand epistemological proof that 
their being is the result of a conscious and free act of God. This means that Abdiel‟s 
claim that God “made / thee what thou art … and circumscribed [all the angels‟] 
being” is a mere interpretation—he has logically induced God‟s role in his being from 
God‟s status and his own finite existence (VII, 823-25).  
 Satan realizes that Abdiel‟s traditional explanation for angelic existence is 
inductive and therefore an interpretation of their existence with no first-hand 
epistemological justification. He then takes the opportunity to offer an alternative 
interpretation claiming that he wishes “by proof to try” Abdiel‟s traditional 
explanation of angelic existence. Satan‟s dismantling of the traditional interpretation 
is sound, Abdiel cannot prove that he was created by God; however, Satan proceeds 
in making a similar logical error—leaping from no justification to asserting an 
alternative for which he has no more or less proof than Abdiel. That is, his critique of 
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Abdiel‟s claim, that it is a subjective interpretation, can be leveled at his own claim 
that the angels are “self-begot, self-raised / by their own quickening power” (860-61). 
However, if Satan were to be right, it would fundamentally change the angels‟ moral 
relationship to God, effectively freeing them from the obligation to act in accordance 
with divine law.  
 The alternative existential explanations articulated in Satan and Abdiel‟s 
debate demonstrates the moral agency that connects the disparate moral paradigms. 
Indeed, the competing interpretations of their existence and whether it is contingent 
on God is precisely what makes the angels moral agents similar to humans. The 
conclusions that result from both Satan and Abdiel‟s inductions reveal their capacity 
for reason, the faculty with which moral facts are assessed and chosen. Since Satan 
chooses a different explanation from the traditional one, he shows the angels to be 
free, and further that Abdiel‟s continued faith in God as his Creator is a free action. 
Therefore, their debate demonstrates the agency that connects the disparate paradigms 
of Milton‟s Christian moral history. For Abdiel, choosing to show gratitude to God by 
recognizing that, as angels, they are secondary creations and therefore ought to accept 
God‟s superior merit as their creator is the highest virtue. On the other hand, Satan 
focuses on the latitude that they are given in heaven and decides that he is the sole 
arbiter of his own morality. Abdiel‟s position is a strong expression of virtue ethics: 
that the agent interprets the moral state of affairs and chooses actions based on their 
identification with over-arching virtues, yet his display of agency through 
interpretation of his moral state of affairs creates common ground between his own 
paradigm and other before and after his own.  
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 In the third paradigm, Adam and Eve are given moral agency as well and 
while their context in Eden is distinct from previous paradigms, the qualities of a 
moral agent remain constant. Adam engages in the discourse started by Satan and 
Abdiel in their debate over the angels‟ existential beginnings when he first awakens 
into consciousness. Not only does this demonstrate a parallel in moral concerns, but a 
common method with which to engage them. The cause of his own creation seems to 
be an innate question since he immediately supplicates his surroundings for 
information about his creator. Given that a moral obligation follows from the creator-
created relationship, Adam not only employs reason in the form of causal logic but 
does so in a moral situation. His interpretation of himself and his surroundings 
demonstrates a form of agency that is consistent with the agency represented in 
previous paradigms. 
 When Adam relates his first moments of consciousness to Raphael he 
attempts to determine a cause for the experiences relayed by his senses. He then 
internalizes this model for understanding the world by applying the same causal logic 
to himself, a priori. It seems that he takes a look at “ye hills and dales, ye rivers, 
woods, and plains” and deduces that they have existed before his awakening (VIII, 
275). If their existence precedes his creation, then it is more likely that he was the 
result of some cause rather than springing into existence of his own volition. 
Determining that he has a definite cause is an implicit choice in itself but he dwells on 
the nature of the force that brought about his existence. After he implores his 
surroundings for the answer to his question he first says “not of myself,” which 
means that at least for an instant he considers the proposition of self-creation that 
64 
 
Satan posits in Book V (VIII, 278). Yet very unlike Satan, Adam rapidly moves from 
his consideration of self-genesis in the negative to a creating Other.  
 In essence, Adam leaps to the conclusion that he is the result of a designing 
Other and therefore articulates a simple version of the teleological argument.
 1
 He 
imagines that the scene before him as well as himself must be the result of a 
conscious act of design, and further, a benevolent design due to its beauty. He may be 
simplistic in applying his innate reason in this way, but Adam interprets his 
awakening and his surroundings in order to exemplify the reason that marks moral 
agents as such. He assesses his situation, including the landscape and creatures as 
well as himself, and chooses to posit an external cause for himself and the world. 
Indeed, he engages in a dialogue with the world in an effort to “know” his creator 
God, which happens to be the professed purpose of the new science according to 
Francis Bacon and others like him.
 2
 The new science seeks to understand God by 
reverse-engineering his image through investigation and interpretation of the world, a 
process that is Adam‟s first act after being created.  
 Adam chooses one explanation over another; either he was self-created or he 
was created by a designing Other. In Milton‟s terms, a choice like his one implies 
empirical reason and therefore fits the definition of a moral agency described in 
Areopagitica. Eden extends beyond the physical and represents a moral paradise in 
which Adam, as a created moral agent, freely enters into an obligatory relationship 
                                                 
1
 This reference to the teleological argument echoes the opening of de Doctrina Christiana 
when Milton mentions it as an axiom of his treatise. 
 
2
 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says that it was Francis Bacon‟s impression that 
“scientific explanation or appreciation … is a form of Christian divine service,” which means  that 
according to Bacon scientific exploration and discovery is designed to be applied to God and his 
“eternal purpose.”  
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with God. Since Adam chooses God as the explanation for his being, he also chooses 
to know, respect, and obey him on moral grounds. His decision is portrayed as a 
natural occurrence, yet it represents a new form of agency. There is no indication that 
the angels made the same choice upon creation, at least not until Abdiel are faced 
with Satan‟s alternative. Further, it seems that the angels are ill-equipped for such a 
decision since Abdiel was the only one to remain loyal out of a third of heaven‟s host.  
 Therefore, Adam interprets his own existential beginning in accordance with 
Abdiel‟s reasoning. Both Adam and Abdiel freely enter into an obligatory moral 
relationship with God since they choose him as the explanation for their being. The 
deployment of reason in both cases means that the moral agent is performing the 
same intellectual work. The equivalence of the intellectual work establishes 
continuity between the two paradigms despite the differences in the agents and their 
experience. The fall of humanity, however, marks a drastic change in the moral 
landscape and increases the distance between the moral agents and God. This distance 
means that the agents after this point engage with moral law differently, though in 
Michael‟s explanation of the Old Testament history it becomes clear that the same 
intellectual work entailed in being a moral agent remains constant even though that 
work is distributed differently. 
 It seems that Adam and Eve are gradually liberated after the fall because they 
transition from a deontological singularity to virtue ethics. That is, it seems as though 
by the end of Book XII they are capable of exercising more intellectual moral 
freedom. However, their moral agency proves more difficult to wield than expected, 
as shown in Book X. God has repaired “their senses dark” but has not shown them the 
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way to control their passions. Adam first attempts to make sense of the new world 
corrupted by their transgression by trying to determine what their punishment, 
“death,” means (III: 188). Adam‟s “cleared senses” do not convey the understanding 
of the consequence of their first transgression, nor do they grant true understanding of 
the justice that the law seeks to achieve. However, the accurate interpretation of their 
moral situation starts to progress when he reconciles with Eve and they begin to reach 
conclusions. This seems to indicate that on their own Adam and Eve‟s moral reason is 
doomed to failure, but together they can perceive their situation and its new 
requirements more clearly.  
 However, the fullest clarity that Adam and Eve achieve comes only at the end 
of a process, consideration and investigation of the actions that are open to them. 
Adam is afraid of the curses that his progeny will give him and Eve—more 
poignantly—is afraid of the suffering that will be endured by subsequent generations. 
Both of these prospects represent something that should be avoided, which is why 
they consider the conclusion that a utilitarian suicide is the best course of action. 
Adam and Eve‟s new freedom begins to look more like a burden because now they 
have to decide whether suicide or the suffering endured by all the generations of 
humanity is the bigger evil. Suicide is of course over-ridden by another course of 
action: Adam finds that to allow justice to be served earning mercy for humanity is 
the best possible option. The process of determining the best course of action 
demonstrates the continued capacity of moral agency. Not only do Adam and Eve 
interpret their moral context by identifying good and evil—good being the prevention 
of suffering and suffering itself—but they also demonstrate the ability to discern 
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gradients of each. That is, some things are more evil than others, and some things are 
more good. 
 The senses that God intended to make clear seem to involve perception and 
reason, which together permit the identification and discernment of good and evil. 
They have changed the world and their collaborative reasoning scene in Book X is the 
point at which they begin to interpret their new moral context. They determine both 
what is good and evil and then which course of action they should take. The moral 
process takes place in the subject and therefore represents a virtue ethical paradigm 
akin to that of heaven and is in this case successfully performed. However, as 
Michael shows them in Books XI and XII, Adam and Eve‟s progeny are not so 
successful at interpreting the moral world, that is, recognizing evil, but preferring the 
good. From Cain, to Nimrod, to the masses that oppose Noah, humanity continually 
falls short of the moral good even though they did enjoy long periods of harmony. In 
other words, humanity had the tools to be good moral agents but prove largely 
incapable of wielding their agency to achieve good results. This is why, after a period 
of success and failure in a virtue ethical system, humanity was given a set of 
paternalistic laws which guides the interpretation of what is good and evil as agents 
determine right action in their own context.  
 Because human moral agents were given an extensive list of laws, this moral 
paradigm is dominated by a deontological normative structure. This becomes the 
biggest obstacle for Milton‟s moral continuity since deontology seems to defer the 
abilities that he claims defines moral agency in Areopagitica. Mosaic Law reverses 
the cognitive moral process found in Areopagitica because the agent has to determine 
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what the truth is from the guidelines presented by the law. Yet while this represents a 
deviation from the agency found in previous paradigms, the same intellectual work is 
occurring because Michael‟s explanation and justification for the Old Testament law 
make it a didactic enterprise meant to instruct humanity in how to interpret the moral 
world and discern good and evil. Since the same intellectual work is occurring in a 
moral situation in the strict deontology of the fourth paradigm, it ends up bearing a 
surprisingly strong connection to the previous paradigms and preserves the continuity 
of what makes moral agency according to Areopagitica. That is, all of the elements of 
a moral situation and a moral agent—including identification and interpretation of a 
situation through moral reason, as well as choosing a course of action—are present in 
the Mosaic formulation and therefore this paradigm is consistent with those that 
precede it.  
 The connection between the agency described by Michael in Book XII and the 
agency in Areopagitica is even stronger because it is the paradigm in which Milton 
lived and wrote. However, the representation of the fifth paradigm gets increasingly 
abstract because it continually gets more remote from Adam‟s experience. This 
means that the agency performed in the fifth paradigm is not dramatized as it was in 
previous paradigms. Since there is no action in the poem that demonstrates the moral 
agency that connects the final paradigm with the rest of Christian moral history, the 
only evidence of it is Michael‟s description of the transformation from the Old to the 
New Testament. That is, the transition from “works of law” in Old Testament 
deontology, to “works of faith” or the virtue ethics of the New Testament (XII, 306) 
is described, not demonstrated. The difference between these paradigms is the locus 
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of moral discernment, “works of law” implies “imposition of strict” laws which are 
meant to “discover sin” effectively interpreting the world for the agent (306; 290). 
However, Areopagitica rejects paternalistic laws and emphasizes “works of faith” 
along with a moral empiricism and experimentation that gives much more power and 
freedom to individual moral agents who have to “discover sin” for themselves. 
 The fifth paradigm is characterized by an increase in freedom. The burden of 
moral discernment and interpretation is again placed on moral agents which means 
they have the same moral freedom that Adam and Eve did just after the fall. 
However, this time they have been taught how to wield such freedom by Mosaic Law. 
Michael indicates humanity‟s new capacity for engaging in moral situations by 
pointing out the paternalism that ends after the first coming of the Son. In other 
words, humanity has been “disciplined / from shadowy types of truth” by the Mosaic 
Law so that the “law of faith” can “guide them in all truth” (303; 490). Moral actions 
were previously based on a paternalistic body of laws, but after the incarnation of the 
Son they are based on the character of the moral agent and the consequence they are 
able to produce. The shift from the Old to the New Testament, therefore, is a change 
in the mechanism that “discovers sin” from a body of strict laws to the judgment of 
the individual moral agent.  
 In effect, the Old Testament paradigm reified into the Mosaic Law—a 
hardened body of laws meant to defend against sin—then the incarnation of the Son 
marks the point at which they are offered what Michael refers to as a “better 
cov‟nant” (XII: 302). The law, then, becomes less rigid as the agent becomes the 
mechanism by which the moral world is interpreted and discerned with only the 
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guiding force or faith. Michael uses a war metaphor to illustrate the transition of the 
moral interpretive burden. He implies that the strict Mosaic Law has forged human 
agency so as to “arm / with spiritual armor, able to resist / Satan‟s assaults” (XII, 490-
92). In other words, humanity was given the ability to contend with evil through both 
their experience with the Mosaic Law and the grace of the Son. However, with this 
ability, which Michael calls “the law of faith,” comes greater independence to grapple 
with the moral world and interpret it individually though the empiricism and 
experimentation described in Areopagitica.  
 The interpretation of the moral world, which is now the responsibility of the 
moral agent, is thus closely connected throughout Milton‟s poetry. He makes a classic 
articulation of virtue ethics at the end of Book XII which solidifies the final 
paradigm‟s normative moral structure; however, when he says “virtue, which is 
reason” he connects the moral good, or the preference thereof, with reason: the ability 
to interpret the world (XII, 98). Further, it is the very thing that classifies a moral 
agent as such in Areopagitica. In other words, to be morally good is to be adept at 
interpreting the moral world, therefore, when “reason in man is obscured, or not 
obeyed” they require something to mediate between the agent and the world—Mosaic 
Law—yet through that experience humanity acquires the capacity to engage with the 
moral world directly (XII, 86). Therefore, Milton bridges the differences between the 
different eras in Christian moral history, principally the gap between the Old and the 
New Testaments, with moral agency by showing that in the former agency was being 
forged by reverse-engineering moral truth, so that in the latter it can be deployed, yet 
much the same intellectual work was occurring in either paradigm.  
71 
 
 Since Milton claims in Areopagitica that the “knowledge and survey of vice is 
in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of 
error to the confirmation of truth,” his morality is a process rather than a reified body 
of laws (939). Moreover, it requires agents with ability to “survey” and “scan” the 
moral world—that is, moral agents must be intellectually capable of engaging with 
moral concepts. If the agent were not capable of engaging on some level with 
morality intellectually they would not have moral agency and morality would be 
empty of meaning, because all creatures would serve necessity not their creator. By 
claiming that the “survey of vice” and the “scanning of error” is necessary for  moral 
agents Milton is encouraging the investigation and individual interpretation of the 
moral world which takes the form of a process of empiricism and experimentation 
akin to the new science. Therefore, Kuhn‟s paradigmatical view of the history of 
science yields insight into Milton‟s representation of Christian moral history in 
Paradise Lost. The moral history represented in the poem can, therefore, be better 
illustrated by feedback loops rather than a steady crescendo of progress. The progress 
of moral history, both in terms of the success of the agents of that paradigm and in the 
latitude granted to those agents, accelerates and recedes over the course of the 
Christian history. Therefore, Kuhn‟s historical model typifies Milton‟s depiction of 
history better than traditional models of progress. 
 The careful survey and scanning of Milton‟s moral history reveals a 
fragmented timeline of success and failure. Each paradigm is difficult to connect with 
those that surround it and that means that the epic is made up of a series of synchronic 
paradigms which are internally but not thoroughly consistent with one another. This 
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presents a problem for the immutability of God, for if his law changes over time, then 
he must change over time. However, in the interest of “justifying the ways of God to 
man” Milton solves this problem (I.26). His formulation of morality as a process, 
anchored in his view of moral agency in Areopagitica, provides a consistent element 
around which to base the moral equation. By emphasizing moral agency and the 
individual‟s power of reason Milton constructs a holistic, diachronic view of 
Christian moral history marked by paradigm shifts. This paradigmatical view of 
moral history reconciles the apparent inconsistencies between the disparate 
paradigms, even the Old and New Testament, by demonstrating morality as an 




 The future of this project needs to explore the role of God and Christ in the 
process of moral change and in the individual‟s process of moral discernment. 
Milton‟s writings seem to oscillate between secular are religious thought as it 
grapples with Christian history; therefore, the way he negotiates his humanism in 
natural philosophy and in sacred sources is a central question as this project evolves. 
Not to mention, the context of Milton‟s thought, both poetic and philosophic, among 
his peers requires further investigation. However, first and foremost, the idea of moral 
history as it is expressed in the poetics of Paradise Lost needs more thorough 
treatment, which raises questions of moral language and its change across Christian 
history. The narrative evidence in this project‟s current form stands as a mere first 
step in investigating the idea of coherence in moral history as an aspect of the larger 
project to “justify the ways of God to man” and create a coherent picture of the 
Christian cosmos (I: 26). 
 However, this project presently shows how Milton‟s theodicy represents an 
attempt to establish continuity in the Christian cosmos and in doing so “justify the 
ways of God to man.” This attempt is expressed most clearly in the cosmic setting of 
Paradise Lost as he presents a coherent picture of Heaven, Hell and Earth, which 
together with his metaphysical monism, unifies the human understanding of God as 
the immutable first cause, and an “eternal purpose” which shapes existence. However, 
the coherence of the settings of Paradise Lost is not the only obstacle to 
understanding the nature of God as immutable, but there is also God‟s consistency 
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over time in regard to the moral law. Either conclusion runs into problems of 
arbitrariness and is therefore avoided by traditional Christian thought.  
The plot of Paradise Lost is driven by either change in the moral landscape or 
the breach of the laws that create that landscape, and the subsequent establishment of 
a new moral order, which means the premise of the poem is based in moral change, as 
the first line states. In other words, since the epic is driven by change in the moral 
state of affairs it becomes necessary to investigate the nature of that change as the 
poem develops a coherent image of the Christian cosmos. However, this means that 
God is mutable, and dangerously close to being arbitrary, because he can change his 
“eternal purpose” at will, but to safeguard against an understanding of God that 
makes his law arbitrary the gaps in moral history must be bridged. In other words, 
Milton‟s attempt to “justify the ways of God to man” includes his attempt to establish 
continuity in the face of a Christian plot beset by change. Milton tries to bridge the 
gaps in the moral systems that pervade Christian moral history by appealing to human 
reason as something that actively interprets the moral world and uses a version of 
cognitive moral engagement to develop a logical continuity across Christian history. 
 Milton‟s moral theory in Areopagitica emphasizes reason, choice, and 
personal freedom, and though Paradise Lost was written later, it remains true to the 
values expressed in Milton‟s earlier works. The formulation of moral reason as the 
means by which moral agents interpret the moral world poses a problem for history 
because this formulation does not seem to remain constant in every era of Christian 
history. However, Milton‟s version of agency provides a solution to the problem of 
continuity that it seems to present in relation to the form and expectations of agency 
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in the different periods of moral history. Therefore, Milton is developing a logical 
antinomy through narrative in an attempt to solve the apparent paradoxes presented 
by the history that his epic depicts. He does this by building common elements of the 
cognitive moral process into the moments that seem to conflict with the moral 
structures that came before and after. Because these common elements of agency are 
present, agency itself bridges the gaps of inconsistency that seems to plague Christian 
moral history. In this way, Milton provides an antinomy that reconciles the 
differences between the differing expectations of moral engagement in different 
moral periods. In other words, the claim of this thesis is that part of the aim of 
Paradise Lost is to present moral agents across time and though they have different 
moral contexts, they share central tenets of a cognitive moral process.  
 The gaps in moral history that drive the narrative of Paradise Lost becomes 
clear when normative moral structures are applied to the moral landscape presented in 
the poem. Normative moral structures are a way to characterize the expectations of 
moral agents in that structure. Virtue ethics, for example is a structure incompatible 
with deontology, and yet both of these structures are clearly found in the history 
represented in the poem. This incompatibility creates the gaps in moral history. Given 
the scope of the history in Paradise Lost it quickly becomes necessary to develop a 
historical construction in an effort to organize the succession of normative structures 
and further this analysis. Thomas Kuhn‟s theory of the history of science as a series 
of paradigm shifts becomes a useful way to frame the moral history of Paradise Lost 
for a number of reasons.  
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 If the gaps in moral history are viewed as shifting from one paradigm to 
another—or one normative structure to another—then the moral timeline starts to 
come into focus. There are, of course, many paradigm shifts over the course of moral 
history, and this is the subject of future exploration in this project, however, the 
current issue is the nature of the moral paradigm shifts and  the attempt to bridge 
them using moral agency. While Kuhn‟s historical framework effectively organizes 
the moral timeline it also fragments it into a series of synchronic cross-sections that 
are only internally consistent. However, even though Kuhn‟s theory exacerbates the 
problem at hand it also organizes the history in a way that supports Milton‟s efforts to 
establish diachronic continuity, which he does by demonstrating that morality is a 
cognitive process manifest in every paradigm in the poem. 
 Milton appeals to reason as a cognitive process in order to establish a 
diachronic link between the fragmented synchronic moral paradigms. Putting such 
emphasis on moral activity as a process in which the individual investigates, 
interprets, and learns from experience in the moral world menas that morality is not 
composed of eternal, monolithic truths that have to be manipulated in order to fit into 
each successive paradigm. Here again Kuhn becomes a logical framework for a 
rendering of morality as a process because his theory of paradigms was originally 
applied to the scientific enterprise which shares many characteristics with Milton‟s 
moral agency. Milton asks the “warfarring Christian” to “scan” and “survey” the 
moral world which effectively makes the moral cognitive process into a science 
engaged with empiricism and, in certain circumstances, experimentation. Agency can 
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therefore adapt to each paradigm with its own divine decrees and social moral 
knowledge found in any given paradigm.  
Therefore, while Milton‟s focus on the cognitive abilities of individual moral 
agents initially seems to pose problems for the continuity of moral history, because, 
as is made clear by Kuhn‟s theory of paradigm shifts, it does not seem to be 
consistent over time, it also creates a stronger bridge over the gaps in moral history 
caused by change in the existing moral landscape. The project of coherence in moral 
history is unlike Kuhn‟s since it does not stop at a fragmented timeline, but attempts 
to connect them after acknowledging that there is a problem. However, Kuhn‟s theory 
of paradigm shift remains relevant as it applies to the structure and organization of the 
problem, which in turn allows the project of coherence to ensue. Milton‟s bridges 
over these gaps is thrown into sharp relief in Paradise Lost when what Milton says in 
the Areopagitica is applied, his moral history organized with Kuhn‟s historical theory 
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